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Technological Progress and Well-Being
Ofer Tur-Sinai*
Under the utilitarian justification for the patent system, patents
advance overall well-being by promoting technological progress. As
patents incentivize innovation through the grant of market exclusivity,
market demand has a leading role in directing innovation. The reliance
on market demand reflects a choice of preference satisfaction as the
criterion of well-being underlying the patent system. Accordingly, the
concept of technological progress that the patent system is set to promote
is rather simplistic. It includes those future goods that current market
participants would value the most, or in other words: new stuff that sells.
This Article deviates from this conventional account of technological
progress that governs the field. It criticizes the reliance on preference
satisfaction and the ensuing equation between market value and social
value. Drawing on philosophical literature and empirical studies in
economics and psychology, this Article reveals the shortcomings of the
preference satisfaction criterion of well-being, and demonstrates that an
innovative product’s high-market demand does not guarantee that it will
significantly enhance overall well-being. Ultimately, by incentivizing the
development of certain innovations with a relatively low social value, the
patent system might divert resources away from other, more beneficial,
activities.
To better align incentives with social value, this Article contends that
innovation law and policy should be predicated on an objective criterion
of well-being rather than on preference satisfaction. By holding that
certain things are intrinsically valuable for people, an objective criterion
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allows a shift away from a view of technological progress as an end in
itself to a view of technological progress as a means to enable better lives.
This new perspective entails a more significant role for the state in
directing innovation. On a prescriptive level, the proposed approach
mandates assigning greater weight to various schemes of direct
government funding of innovation, including prizes and grants, as well
as certain revisions within patent law itself.
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INTRODUCTION
The primary justification for the patent system is utilitarian: the need
to promote technological progress.1 As patents induce investment in
1. For sources noting the utilitarian nature of the patent system, see, for example, Dan L. Burk
& Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597 (2003); Robert P.
Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA.
L. REV. 359, 359 (1992); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 554 (2012); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1181–82 (2000). This concept is embedded in the United
States Constitution, which empowers Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also infra note 19 and accompanying text.
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research and development (“R&D”) by securing market exclusivity,
market demand appears to have a leading role in driving technological
innovation in society.2 Indeed, in the economic and legal literature
comparing the patent system with alternative policy tools for
incentivizing innovation—such as grants and prizes—the reliance of the
patent system on the market is commonly conceived as one of its greatest
virtues.3 As opposed to government actors, the patent system is viewed
as a neutral platform—a “decentralized decision-making device”—which
utilizes private information dispersed among individuals to guide
potential innovators toward the most desired avenues for investment.4
Accordingly, under the current legal regime, once the patent system is
established, the state is presumed to have a very limited role in directing
innovative activity. The apparent neutrality of a market-based platform
allows policy makers and scholars to avoid dealing with fundamental
questions: Why is technological progress desirable to society? How does
it promote human welfare? Is this equally true with respect to different
types of innovation? Under the prevailing approach, technological
progress is generally viewed as good per se, and “the more, the better.”
To be sure, such a perception of technological progress is anything but
neutral. It represents political ideologies of economic liberalism,
capitalism, and consumerism, under which constant innovation serves as
means for maintaining perpetual growth and satisfying consumers’ everevolving desires for new products and services.5 Clearly, not all people
share this general worldview and the modernist notion of progress it
entails.6 In fact, the ideal of perpetual growth has attracted, in other

2. For a more detailed account of the mechanism by which patents are said to induce R&D, see
infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 40–44.
4. Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research
Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 695 (1983). See also Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) (“Among its other virtues, the patent system is often extolled as a neutral
platform in which the market—rather than a government entity—determines the allocation of
resources for technological development.”).
5. See also infra text accompanying notes 34–35.
6. For critical accounts of this modernist notion of progress, see, for example, Margaret Chon,
Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97,
100 (1993) (rejecting the view of progress as a “liberating upward trajectory” and advancing a
postmodern view of progress); Estelle Derclaye, Eudemonic Intellectual Property: Patents and
Related Rights as Engines of Happiness, Peace, and Sustainability, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
495, 508–19 (2012) (arguing that the progress ideology is parochial); Simone A. Rose, The
Supreme Court and Patents: Moving Toward a Postmodern Vision of ‘Progress’?, 23 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1197, 1233–38 (advancing a postmodern perception of
progress).
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contexts, a great deal of criticism by economists and environmentalists.7
Yet, in continuing to address technological innovation as an unequivocal
end—without questioning its merits—the discourse in the intellectual
property (“IP”) arena is still governed, to a considerable extent, by this
traditional conception. Notably, the current design of innovation law
does not only reflect a certain ideology—it also has practical implications
in terms of resource allocation for R&D. As highlighted by various
scholars, a market-based platform for incentivizing innovation may fail
to provide an adequate incentive to produce certain valuable innovations
in a manner that could be problematic both from a distributive and
utilitarian perspective.8
This Article seeks to contribute to the critical analysis of the patent
system’s allocative function,9 by focusing on an aspect of the current
legal regime that has been largely ignored in the literature: the
embracement of preference satisfaction as the criterion of well-being
underlying the system. In general, under a utilitarian approach, the state’s
role is to advance overall human well-being.10 Yet, there is no single
answer to the question of what constitutes human well-being. The
question of which criterion of well-being the state should adopt is
extensively debated by philosophers and, in recent years, by legal
theorists.11 Nevertheless, in the context of innovation law and policy, the
7. See, e.g., James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome?: What the Squabbles over Genetic Patents
Could Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 97, 109–10
(F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (outlining the main critiques of perpetual growth).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 45–63.
9. By using the term “allocative function,” this Article refers to the effect of the patent system
on the manner by which resources for R&D are allocated. To maximize utility, the patent system
should ideally direct resources toward inventions with the most social value; yet, in reality, as
suggested above and further explored in this Article, this is far from being the case. While the term
“allocative function” is not often used in patent literature, it is commonly used in other contexts
while referring to the manner by which a given institution allocates or directs the use of scarce
resources. Harold Demsetz, most famously, has used this term in describing how property rights
provide incentives to use resources productively. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967).
10. See, e.g., Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 255–56 (2008) (discussing the moral framework of utilitarianism); William
W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing
World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 602 (2007) (noting how utilitarianism “urges lawmakers to
choose the course of action that is most likely to produce the highest net social value”).
11. For relevant discussions, see generally MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR
DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012); JOHN BRONSTEEN ET AL., HAPPINESS
AND THE LAW (2015) [hereinafter BRONSTEEN ET AL., HAPPINESS & THE LAW]; LAW AND
HAPPINESS (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105
(2000); John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583 (2010) [hereinafter
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question is seldom even asked, and the law-and-economics approach,
which equates well-being with preference satisfaction, prevails.12 Under
such perception of well-being, the concept of technological progress that
the state ought to promote is rather simplistic—it includes those future
goods that current market participants would value the most, or, in other
words, “new stuff that sells.”13
This Article challenges the reliance on preference satisfaction and the
ensuing equation between market value and social value. While drawing
on philosophical literature that deliberates the meaning of well-being, it
demonstrates the failure of preference satisfaction to serve as a
meaningful definition of well-being. Preferences, particularly consumer
preferences, might be misinformed or distorted for a variety of reasons.
Numerous studies in economics and psychology show that individual
consumers cannot be trusted to make choices that advance their own wellbeing. If this is the case, then aggregate market demand clearly cannot
serve as a good indicator of social value, and, correspondingly, a marketbased platform cannot be trusted to produce optimal incentives for R&D.
More specifically, as demonstrated in this Article, there are good reasons
to suspect that the patent system provides an overincentive to develop,
produce, and disseminate certain innovations with a relatively low social

Bronsteen et al., Happiness]; John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis,
62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013) [hereinafter Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis]; Daphna LewinsohnZamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669
(2003).
12. See, e.g., James Boyle, Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
5, 12 (2007) (noting that “[w]hen correctives are offered to this perspective, they tend to be offered
from outside the efficiency calculus . . . rather than as criticisms of the definition of efficiency or
innovation itself”); Boyle, supra note 7, at 110–11 (criticizing the narrow outlook characterizing
IP scholarship). For a discussion of the prevalent approach, see also infra Part I. For notable
exceptions, see Derclaye, supra note 6 (advancing a eudemonic perception of IP rights); Estelle
Derclaye, What Can Intellectual Property Law Learn from Happiness Research?, in METHODS
AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 177 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013)
(considering a potential role for happiness studies in the field of intellectual property); William W.
Fisher III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1463–72 (2010)
(employing a “human flourishing” approach in support of legal protection for user innovation); see
generally Fisher & Syed, supra note 10 (exploring various possible justifications for allocating
resources to research developing countries’ diseases, including a utilitarian justification that uses a
quasi-objective measure for well-being); Arti K. Rai, The Ends of Intellectual Property: Health as
a Case Study, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (2007) (identifying potential metrics for welfare that
may be used in the context of government funding of innovation in the specific context of public
health); Brett M. Frischmann, Capabilities, Spillovers, and Intellectual Progress: Toward a Human
Flourishing Theory for Intellectual Property (Cardozo Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 442, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2500196 (considering a capabilities approach
as an alternative approach to evaluating IP law in lieu of the current utilitarian framework).
13. Boyle, supra note 12, at 12; Boyle, supra note 7, at 115.
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value—for example, various electronic gadgets or other luxury products.
This, in turn, might come at the expense of investing in other, more
beneficial, endeavors. Among other things, it may further divert
resources away from those areas that have already been identified in the
literature as susceptible for underinvestment.14 To reduce some of these
distortive effects, certain policy measures are warranted. Yet, as a basis
for such policy reforms, this Article first attempts to formulate a new
conceptual framework that relies on an alternative criterion of well-being.
After surveying different criteria of well-being offered in the
philosophical literature, this Article recommends adopting an objective
well-being approach. Under such an approach, certain qualities are
intrinsically valuable for people and their fulfillment promotes their wellbeing. Thus, well-being is not reduced to the satisfaction of preferences,
but rather determined by objective external standards. Embracing an
objective criterion of well-being as a foundation to the utilitarian end to
promote technological progress facilitates a shift away from a view of
technological progress as an end in itself to a view of technological
progress as a means to enable better lives. Under such a perspective, the
state can no longer treat innovation in a so-called “neutral way.”
Different innovative projects may have different social values, and
priorities should be set accordingly. Once an objective criterion of wellbeing is adopted, it becomes apparent that a market-based platform
cannot yield optimal incentives to innovate. Thus, an objective approach
entails a more significant role for the state in directing innovative activity.
On a prescriptive level, an objective approach to innovation law
mandates assigning a greater weight to alternative institutional
mechanisms for incentivizing innovation, including grants and prizes.
The major difficulty commonly associated with such schemes relates to
the government’s need to make funding decisions without sufficient
information regarding the costs and benefits of R&D. Yet, once the
deficiencies of the preference satisfaction criterion are recognized and an
objective perspective is embraced, the informational advantage of the IP
system seems overstated. Thus, this Article’s insights bolster the
arguments already made by various economists and legal scholars in
support of a greater role for alternative mechanisms within the innovation
ecosystem, while shedding a new light on the function that such
mechanisms should play in reducing the patent system’s distortive
effects. At the same time—to the extent the state already employs such
schemes—an objectivist innovation agenda developed in accordance
with the guidelines set forth in this Article might facilitate a more
14. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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systematic and consistent framework for decision making. Together with
the recommendation to accord greater weight to nonpatent mechanisms,
this Article also considers the need to fine-tune the patent system itself in
various manners.
The main contribution of this Article to existing scholarship is in
identifying and criticizing the use of preference satisfaction as the
criterion of well-being underlying innovation law and policy. As noted
above, other scholars have importantly identified various types of
innovations that are underincentivized as a result of the patent system’s
reliance on the market.15 General criticism of the notion of progress
underlying patent law can also be found in the literature.16 Yet, this
Article takes an extra step in challenging the conventional wisdom by
highlighting the shortcomings of the preference satisfaction criterion and
exploring the potential of employing an alternative perspective within the
utilitarian approach governing innovation law.17 Shifting the focus away
from the practical impacts of a market-based approach for incentivizing
innovation toward the theoretical basis undergirding such resort to the
market, places the discussion within the wider context of the
philosophical and legal literature that debates the proper criterion of wellbeing the state should employ. By using the insights of such literature—
as well as interdisciplinary studies investigating consumption patterns
and the relationship between technology and happiness—this Article
provides a new basis for the critical discussion of innovation law and
policy and enables the exposure of additional distortive effects and
shortcomings of the current legal regime, which so far have been
insufficiently studied. In offering an alternative theory of well-being in
lieu of the prevailing preferences theory, this Article supplies a
framework that seeks to serve as the basis for various policy measures
designed to better align incentives to innovate with social value.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explores the utilitarian
justification for the patent system, outlines the main critiques of the patent
system’s allocative function, and identifies preference satisfaction as the
criterion of well-being currently underlying the patent system. Part II
offers a systematic analysis of the preference satisfaction criterion while

15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 6; see also Brett Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna, Intergenerational
Progress, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 123 (2011) (advocating a view of progress that is committed to
intergenerational justice).
17. While a handful of previous works have explored the possibility of using alternative
measures of welfare in certain contexts, see supra note 12, the literature lacks a comprehensive
evaluation of the various possible criteria of well-being that may be employed by the state as a
basis for innovation policy.
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highlighting its shortcomings. Part III embarks on a quest for an
alternative criterion of well-being and ultimately proposes a shift to an
objective welfare perspective. Part IV considers the normative
implications of the proposed new approach. Finally, Part V addresses
some of the potential criticisms against the thesis advanced in this Article.
I. PATENT LAW AND PREFERENCE SATISFACTION
Under the prevailing utilitarian framework, the role of the patent
system is to advance overall well-being by promoting technological
progress.18 This notion is embedded in the IP Clause of the United States
Constitution, which empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”19 Over the years, various theories have attempted to
demonstrate how the patent system attains this overarching goal.20
The main theory endorsed by courts and commentators alike is the
“incentive-to-invent theory,” which focuses on the role of the patent
system in providing incentives to engage in R&D. 21 The concern
underlying this theory is that, in a world without patents, information
would be underproduced due to its “public good” nature.22 Without
18. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Alongside the utilitarian account of the patent
system, a number of other theories have been offered over the years to provide alternative
justifications for the patent system, including the labor theory and the personality theory. The role
of such theories in explaining current patent law and providing a basis for policy recommendations
has been largely marginal. But see generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (2011) (arguing that while efficiency is an important midlevel principle for IP, the real
normative foundations are Lockean appropriation, Kantian individualism, and Rawlsian
distributive justice).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. While the term “Science” is generally understood as referring
to knowledge, the term “useful Arts” used by the Framers is commonly equated with the modernday term “technology.” See, e.g., Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999
BYU L. REV. 1419, 1437 (1999) (noting that courts and scholars have suggested “technological
arts” as the modern-day equivalent of the term “useful arts”); Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A
Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1948)
(“The term ‘useful arts,’ as used in the Constitution and in the titles of the patent statutes is best
represented in modern language by the word ‘technology.’”).
20. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not QuiteHoly Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 256 (1996) (describing many of the economic justifications
for the patent system offered over the years).
21. For sources describing the incentive-to-invent theory, see, for example, Wendy J. Gordon,
Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617, 632 (Peter Cane &
Mark Tushnet eds., 2003); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247 (1994); Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent
Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 791–92 (1992).
22. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1580 (referring to “the public goods nature of
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patents, once the information underlying a new invention reaches the
market, competition by free riders could drive down prices and make it
impossible for the inventor to recoup his or her R&D costs and make a
reasonable profit. By providing legal exclusivity for a limited period,
patents overcome this market failure and provide the missing incentive to
engage in inventive activity.23
Additional theories offered to justify the patent system under the
general utilitarian framework focus on other incentives, including the
incentive to disclose,24 engage in post-inventive activity,25 and design
around.26 While these theories differ in the specific roles they attribute
to the patent system in attaining technological progress, they are all
predicated on the premise that such progress is the patent system’s
ultimate objective.
Accordingly, academic and public discourse in the patent arena
generally focuses on the means to further technological development in
the most efficient manner, while dealing extensively with the patent
system’s effects on the level of innovation, but only infrequently debating
the type of innovation patents should optimally produce.27 Patent
inventions that are expensive to produce but easy to appropriate”); O’Rourke, supra note 1, at 1182
(noting the public goods problem inherent in the production of information).
23. More accurately, as recently highlighted by Peter Lee, patents do not create incentives to
invent, but rather enable market incentives by resolving the market failure described above. Lee,
supra note 4, at 45.
24. The incentive-to-disclose theory focuses on the role that patents purportedly play in
promoting disclosure of information underlying new inventions. For sources describing the
incentive-to-disclose theory, see, for example, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1028–29 (1989);
Gordon, supra note 21, at 632; Ouellette, supra note 1, at 571–81; Julie S. Turner, The
Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CALIF. L. REV.
179, 189–90 (1998).
25. Such post-inventive activity includes further refinement of the invention and its
commercialization. One of the most prominent theories, focusing on post-inventive activity, is the
prospect theory, formulated by Kitch, which highlights the advantages of granting ownership to the
inventor in the technological prospect derived from her invention. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1977). See generally F. Scott Kieff,
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001)
(highlighting the role of patents in incentivizing commercialization). For a novel treatment of the
need to provide incentives to commercialize inventions, see generally Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010). For an argument that there is no need for
patent rights to encourage ex post activity, see Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–31 (2004).
26. The incentive-to-design-around theory highlights the importance of encouraging
competitors to invent noninfringing substitutes to patented technologies. See generally Gordon,
supra note 21, at 632.
27. See Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 51 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 419, 468 (2014) (noting, in the specific context of pharmaceutical innovation, the
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scholarship mostly questions the need for the foregoing incentives28 and
assesses the patent system’s efficacy in securing them.29 It also
highlights the costs associated with the patent system—including the
deadweight loss resulting from noncompetitive pricing of patented
inventions,30 the waste caused by the rent-seeking behavior of inventors
engaged in a race to the patent office,31 and the potential chilling effect
of patents on follow-on innovation.32
Yet, the basic premise invoked by the conventional utilitarian
account—the pivotal mandate to promote technological progress—
generally goes unchallenged. Indeed, technological progress is often
conceived as an end in itself.33 This almost axiomatic regard for the need
to advance technological development is tightly linked to the general
ideologies of economic liberalism, capitalism, and consumerism—which
consider material advancement as the key to a good and happy life.34
According to such a world view, as is prevalent in Western society,
dearth of discussion regarding the type of innovation patents seem to produce). But see James Love
& Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1519 (2007) (discussing the direction of pharmaceutical innovation); see also infra text
accompanying notes 45–63.
28. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1026 (discussing market forces that may enable an
inventor to enjoy a period of exclusivity even without a patent); Gordon, supra note 21, at 632
(noting reputational advantages as something that might reduce the need to provide incentives to
invent through the patent system); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for
Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 485 (2008) (noting that under certain circumstances,
user innovators do not need patent protection to motivate them).
29. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits
of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1905–06 (2013) (highlighting the inadequacy of patent rights in
incentivizing the production of information goods that are more difficult to exclude than others);
see also infra text accompanying notes 56–60.
30. For sources discussing this cost of patents, see, for example, Dam, supra note 21, at 248–
51; Kitch, supra note 25, at 266–67; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871–79 (1990).
31. For sources describing this potential waste, see, for example, Michelle Armond, Introducing
the Defense of Independent Invention to Motions for Preliminary Injunctions in Patent
Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 142–43 (2003); Dam, supra note 21, at 251–52;
Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 308
(1992).
32. For sources discussing the potential chilling effect of patents on follow-on innovation, see,
for example, Merges & Nelson, supra note 30; Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent
Law: Making Sense of Incentives, 50 IDEA 723 (2010).
33. See Derclaye, supra note 6, at 513 (noting that “while the philosophers of the Enlightenment
first saw the development of new technology as a means to a better condition, gradually their
followers saw it as progress itself; thus new technology became an end instead of a means to an
end”).
34. See Chon, supra note 6 (discussing the link between the traditional “modernist” conception
of progress and material growth); Derclaye, supra note 6, at 511–14 (reviewing the history of the
idea of progress and its connection with capitalist ideology).

8_TUR-SINAI_DOCUMENT3 (145-204).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Technological Progress and Well-Being

1/3/2017 1:14 PM

155

technological innovation is clearly warranted as an engine of economic
growth and as a means to satisfying consumers’ constant demand for new
products and services.35
This modernist outlook entails a
noninterventionist approach to innovation law. Under such an approach,
while the state has an important role in promoting innovation, its role in
setting the direction of innovative activity is very limited. The state does
not need to delve into the merits of specific technological advancements,
nor does it need to engage in setting priorities for R&D projects on the
basis of their social value.
Most importantly, the way innovation law is currently structured
removes any pressing need to deal with these type of inquiries. The
patent system is considered the primary policy tool for promoting
technological progress.36 While under nonpatent incentive schemes—
such as grants and prizes—government officials must decide which
innovative projects to fund and how much to reward them, under the
patent system, the market is entrusted with the duty to perform such
functions.37 As explained above, the patent system provides incentives
through granting exclusive rights designed to enable the inventor to
appropriate a larger share of his or her invention’s market value.38 By
design, then, the system assigns the market a major role in directing
innovation. Roughly speaking, the higher the market demand is likely to
be for a future technology, the stronger the incentive the patent system
provides to develop it.39
Indeed, in the economic and legal literature comparing the patent
system with alternative institutional arrangements for incentivizing
innovation, the main alleged benefit of patents is the “posited relationship
between rights to exclude and the use of private information about the
value of inventions.”40 As suggested by economist Harold Demsetz,
35. See supra note 34.
36. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1576; Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond
the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 319 (2013). See also Ho, supra note 27, at 429
(noting patents’ prominent role in innovation policy); Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why
and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 975 (2012)
(same).
37. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at 327 (comparing patents to government-set
rewards). For a general discussion of alternative incentive mechanisms, see infra Part IV.A.
38. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
39. Undoubtedly, future demand for goods not yet in existence can only be roughly estimated
based on market demand for existing products and services. The statement in the text is also
oversimplified in light of patents’ inability to ensure a perfect correlation between an invention’s
market value and the patentee’s return on investment. See infra text accompanying notes 56–60.
40. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 29, at 1911–12. See also Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope,
Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34, 50 n.31 (1995) (noting that
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patents are superior to other strategies in producing “knowledge at
efficient rates.”41 Market prices reflect a staggering amount of private
information, dispersed among individuals, about the costs and benefits of
R&D investments. In relying on the invisible hand of the market, the
patent system utilizes such data to signal “the desired directions of
investment” and “the quantities of resources that should be committed to
invention.”42 Government actors, on the other hand, generally lack such
private information that generates market prices,43 which is the reason
government-led strategies are often considered less efficient in allocating
innovation resources than the patent system.44
Nonetheless, the allocative function of the patent system has been
criticized by various scholars over the years.45 To begin, a market-based
platform for incentivizing innovation is inherently biased toward
inventions that generate value in consumer markets and fails to provide
adequate incentives for the production of nonmarket goods.46 In other
contexts, the inability of the relevant consumers to pay for various

“the regulatory authorities lack information that innovators possess, such as knowledge about the
demand for inventions,” and therefore, the patent system is superior in ensuring that “the monopoly
profit extracted from the market is correlated with the social surplus created by the invention”);
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at 327 (“Patents’ ability to take advantage of private information
is well recognized in the innovation-policy literature.”).
41. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13
(1969).
42. Id. at 12.
43. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber, Public Prizes Versus Market Prices: Should Contests Replace
Patents, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 690, 732 (2015) (noting that “central planners
necessarily lack the detailed private information of inventors, innovators, producers, and consumers
that generate prices in the market for inventions”).
44. See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best
Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 54–55 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 2002) (arguing that one of the patent system’s “obvious virtues” is that it enables a firm to
rely on their superior knowledge regarding the costs and benefits of R&D investments in order “to
screen investments”).
45. For the meaning of the term “allocative function,” see supra note 9.
46. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1687 n.85 (noting that people may have preferences
for things that are not traded in markets). In connection with the patent system, see BRETT M.
FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 109 (2012)
(discussing the predictable bias of IP systems for “intellectual goods that generate the most
appropriable value in consumer markets,” and noting that “[a]s a result, various socially desirable
intellectual goods . . . remain underproduced”); Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 29, at 1905
(summarizing the argument that patent systems fail to create goods whose value is difficult to
appropriate in consumer markets). See also Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and
Environmental Protection: Some Ethical Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755, 764 (2002) (noting, in
the environmental context, the lack of incentive to engage in the production of knowledge where
there is no “end-product” that can be turned into property). For the specific case of basic research,
see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
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innovative products and services might dilute the signal of social value
produced by the market. This might have important distributive
implications by undersupplying production for the poor,47 particularly
when the rich and the poor have different needs for information goods.48
This problem is evident, for example, in the global health field: because
of the poor’s limited ability to pay, very few medicines are developed for
diseases that primarily affect the poor but have little or no impact on the
rich.49 The link between incentives to innovate and one’s ability to pay
might also be problematic from a utilitarian perspective.50 By failing to
capture the welfare-enhancing effect of a certain information good (e.g.,
a life-saving medicine) on the poor, the signal produced by the market
might fall short of reflecting the aggregate social value of such good.51
Another instance where market demand might fail to reflect social value
is when the innovation at hand has significant positive externalities.52
This would be the situation, for example, with respect to certain
infrastructural
intellectual
goods,
including
general-purpose
technologies.53 A similar concern exists in cumulative innovation
settings, where the social value of an existing invention is comprised not
47. See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 36, at 996–99 (highlighting the concern that using IP to
generate innovation will undersupply production for the poor); Lee, supra note 4, at 69 (maintaining
that the patent system fails to generate social innovations that address the “substantive needs of
underprivileged populations”). In a similar fashion, a market-based approach may also result in
underproducing innovation catering to the needs of a small group of individuals, notwithstanding
their ability-to-pay. Consider, for instance, the case of orphan drugs. See infra note 202.
48. Kapczynski, supra note 36, at 999.
49. Fisher & Syed, supra note 10, at 613; Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at 328; Kapczynski,
supra note 36, at 999 n.109; Maxwell R. Morgan, Medicines for the Developing World: Promoting
Access and Innovation in the Post-TRIPS Environment, 64 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 45, 48
(2006); Rai, supra note 12, at 130.
50. See Fisher & Syed, supra note 10, at 618 (maintaining that there is a utilitarian case for
redirecting R&D resources toward diseases that disproportionately affect the developing world).
51. Notably, the distortive effect on incentives resulting from the poor’s limited ability-to-pay
will manifest itself not only when the relevant good is needed exclusively by the poor (in which
case, such good may not be produced at all), but also when the rich and the poor share the same
need. In the latter case, while some resources might be allocated to producing the relevant good,
allocation may nevertheless be suboptimal. See Kapczynski, supra note 36, at 1000 (noting that in
such cases, “relevant information may be produced . . . more slowly or in a smaller supply”).
52. For the definition of positive externalities, see FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 37–38
(defining positive externalities as “benefits . . . realized by one person as a result of another person’s
activity without payment” and noting that “[t]oo few . . . resources may be allocated to activities
that generate positive . . . externalities because those persons deciding whether and how to allocate
resources fail to account for the full range of benefits”).
53. Id. at 254 (noting that general-purpose technologies and other types of infrastructural
intellectual goods benefit society “primarily by facilitating a wide range of downstream productive
activities”). Examples of general-purpose technologies are the steam engine, electricity, and the
computer.
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only of its stand-alone value, but also of its potential value as an inventive
input.54 Finally, a gap between social value and market demand might
exist when the innovative product serves public-good ends, as in the case
of certain innovations related to the environment or to national security.55
Even assuming that market demand reflects social value in an accurate
manner, scholars have noted that patent rights cannot always be trusted
to provide signals regarding expected private returns from innovation that
correlate with market value. Patents, by definition, yield less than full
appropriability (i.e., the ability to capture profits generated by the
innovation) because of their limited scope and duration.56 Rewards for
innovation under a patent regime are also likely to underrepresent market
value due to transaction costs that hinder potential licensing deals.57 In
addition, as recently highlighted by Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed,
patents might suboptimally track market value due to the fact that some
information goods are simply more difficult to exclude than others.58
While no one proposes that it would be efficient to allow an inventor to
internalize the entire social value of his or her invention,59 the patent
system should at least guarantee an award high enough to cover R&D
costs—including a premium for the inherent risk associated with R&D
54. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK
1471, 1499 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (noting
the problem of cumulative innovation, in which “the most important social benefit of an innovation
may be the boost given to later innovators, and this may make the benefits harder to appropriate”);
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 127 (2004) [hereinafter SCOTCHMER,
INNOVATION] (recognizing the three important “boosts” that innovations can give to later
innovators); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and
the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31 (1991) [hereinafter Scotchmer, Giants] (recognizing that
“[p]art of the first innovation’s social value is the boost it gives to later innovators”).
55. See, e.g., FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 265 (highlighting the concern that market demand
would fail to accurately reflect social demand in such cases); Brett Frischmann, Innovation and
Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347,
373–74 (2000) (noting that in these instances, the government must subsidize or control demand
through procurement).
56. Kapczynsky & Syed, supra note 29, at 1905, 1943.
57. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 55, at 363 (“IP may provide sufficient exclusion of
competitors but not lead to appropriation because licensing transaction costs are too high . . . .”);
Kapczynsky, supra note 36, at 988 (“[T]ransactions over information . . . are likely to be
particularly costly.”).
58. See generally Kapczynsky & Syed, supra note 29.
59. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 622 (“[N]o one would suggest that IP should internalize all
the benefits that flow from an intangible.”); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1041 (2005) (maintaining that there is no need to permit
inventors to capture the full social value of their invention). See also FRISCHMANN, supra note 46,
at 39 (noting that the patent system is “designed to enable some internalization of what would
otherwise be external benefits and to promote some productive activities that generate
externalities”).
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
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and a reasonable return on fixed-cost investment—whenever the social
value of the invention exceeds its costs.60 But the patent system cannot
even guarantee such a result.
Basic scientific research exemplifies a context where various of the
above-mentioned considerations play a role in undercutting the ability of
patents to produce incentives to innovate, despite the potentially high
social value of the endeavor. The “yield” from basic research, in terms
of commercial applications, is too uncertain and remote to be adequately
incentivized by private markets.61
Basic research can also be
characterized as “intellectual infrastructure,” as it produces significant
spillovers and its main value is facilitating various downstream uses.62
In addition, the output of basic research might be highly nonexcludable.63
In light of the foregoing, it is easy to understand why basic research is
commonly funded by governments outside the patent system.
This Article adds another important layer to the critique of the patent
system’s allocative function by focusing on the criterion of well-being
upon which the system is founded. The patent system’s reliance on
market exclusivity as the means to incentivize innovation reflects an
implicit choice of the preference satisfaction criterion of well-being.
More specifically, the patent system is predicated on actual preferences—
ones that are revealed through individuals’ market choices.64 As a
general matter, under an actual preferences theory, an individual’s well60. For the need to provide a certain premium for the general risk associated with R&D, see
Chang, supra note 40, at 49 n.28; Scotchmer, Giants, supra note 54, at 30 n.4.
61. As stated by Richard Nelson, “[i]t seems clear that, were the field of basic research left
exclusively to private firms operating independently of each other and selling in competitive
markets, profit incentives would not draw so large a quantity of resources to basic research as is
socially desirable.” Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J.
POL. ECON. 297, 304 (1959). See also Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and
University Technology Transfer, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY 93,
94 (Gary D. Libecap, ed., 2005) (stating that “the purpose of basic scientific research is to provide
inputs for technological progress in the very long term, in which the potential value of any particular
scientific inquiry is largely unpredictable,” and hence, “it is widely agreed that the commercial
market will fail to invest adequately in such research”); Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 29, at 1951
(“[B]asic research is too “upstream” to be funded by the private sector, meaning that its practical
dividends are too uncertain and far off in time to be adequately supported by market incentives.”).
62. FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 253.
63. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 29, at 1951.
64. In theory, actual preferences could also be viewed as external to the act of choice.
Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1687 n.85; Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 323–24 (1977) (discussing
the possibility that preferences would exist outside the realm of choices). See also Eyal Zamir, The
Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 228, 242 (1998) (discussing the notion of second-order
preferences).
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being is advanced to the extent that his or her actual preferences and
desires are fulfilled.65 The patent system’s reliance on preferences when
producing the signal guiding innovative activity reflects a perception that
the value of technological innovation lies predominantly in its ability to
sell, and thereby satisfy consumer preferences.
Basing innovation law on the preference satisfaction criterion of wellbeing can be viewed as a choice—as this criterion is just one out of a few
possible criteria for measuring well-being. While economic theory
generally perceives well-being in terms of the satisfaction of actual
preferences,66 it is not “the only game in town.”67 Other main theories
of well-being include: ideal preferences theories, which focus on the
maximization of hypothetical (rather than actual) preferences that people
would have in certain specified, ideal conditions; hedonistic theories,
which view well-being in terms of mental states and stress the importance
of positive mental states and avoiding negative mental states for human
welfare; and objective theories, which hold that certain qualities—
including physical and mental health, social relationships, and the
experience of pleasure and satisfaction—are intrinsically valuable for
people and thus promote their welfare.68
Though basing innovation law on the preference satisfaction criterion
of well-being is a choice, it is an implicit choice, as it is not the result of
a deliberate decision made by policy makers.69 Yet, it is precisely the
absence of such a discussion—in the face of a legal regime that relies
predominantly on market exclusivity in providing incentives to
innovate—that indicates the endorsement of a preference satisfaction
theory of well-being. In fact, an explicit association of market value with
social value can be found in literature comparing patents with other
institutional approaches for innovation funding. The prevailing opinion
in such comparative accounts is that “[b]ecause they link the magnitude
65. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1677; Zamir, supra note 64, at 234–35.
66. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 7, at 110 (“For those who practice the economics of the Chicago
school, current revealed consumer preferences . . . have an almost totemic power.”); LewinsohnZamir, supra note 11, at 1686–88 (observing the prevalence of preference theories of well-being—
particularly, actual preference theories—among writers in the law-and-economics movement).
67. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1673.
68. See, e.g., id. at 1690 (noting the three main categories of theories of well-being); ADLER,
supra note 11, at 156–59 (same); Zamir, supra note 64, at 234–35 (same). For a detailed discussion
of alternative criteria of well-being, see infra Part III.
69. Not only policy debates, but also patent scholarship, lack sufficient discussion regarding the
relative virtues and shortcomings of the preference satisfaction criterion as compared to alternative
criteria of well-being. See supra note 17. To a large extent, the absence of such a discussion can
be attributed to the general prevalence of actual preferences theories in legal scholarship. See supra
note 66 and accompanying text.
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and direction of innovation incentives to market prices . . . patents may
be a better mechanism than reliance on government funding for ensuring
that all truly valuable information goods—and only truly valuable
information goods—are generated.”70 Hence, market demand is
generally perceived as the ultimate indicator for social value in patent
scholarship. As summed up by leading innovation scholars Peter Menell
and Suzanne Scotchmer, “intellectual property rewards reflect the social
value of the contribution, since the profit is determined by demand.”71
Part II seeks to challenge the embracement of preference satisfaction
as the basis for innovation policy and the associated equation between
market value and social value. It is important to note that the observations
made in this Article are substantively different than the critical arguments
previously made (and explored above) regarding the allocative function
of the patent system. Existing critical accounts focus on manners by
which markets fail to signal information regarding actual preferences or
on how patents suboptimally track market value; yet, they do not
challenge the underlying assumption that satisfying an individual’s
preferences is tantamount to the advancement of that individual’s wellbeing. This Article casts doubt on this fundamental assumption by
exploring the deficiencies of the preference satisfaction criterion of wellbeing, which further weakens the ability to rely on consumer preferences
revealed in the market for technological products as the decisive factor
guiding the direction of innovation. Notably, while existing critical
accounts focus on ways by which the patent system fails to incentivize
socially valuable innovation, Part II demonstrates that the patent system
might, at the same time, provide an overincentive to invest resources in
R&D in certain cases where the technology at hand is not likely to
advance human welfare in any significant manner, notwithstanding its
expected market success.
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PREFERENCE SATISFACTION CRITERION
A. Theoretical and Empirical Observation
Preference theories of well-being essentially hold that a person’s wellbeing is determined by the extent to which his or her preferences are
70. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 29, at 1904 (presenting the common justification for patents
in the literature) (emphases added).
71. See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 54, at 1499 (qualifying the statement to the context of
stand-alone inventions or creations). See also Kapczynski, supra note 36, at 974–75 (presenting
the widely accepted assumption in IP scholarship that “[p]rice links the production of information
to consumer demand, and, by extension, to social welfare”).
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satisfied, regardless of the content of such preferences. 72 Such theories
generally assume that individuals are the best judges of their own
interests, and hence, preference satisfaction would generally lead to the
enhancement of human welfare.73 The prevalence of preference theories
among economists and legal scholars can be attributed primarily to their
alleged antipaternalistic nature and simplicity. 74 Yet, the preference
satisfaction criterion also has grave deficiencies, many of which have
been noted over the years.
The primary objection to the preference satisfaction criterion of wellbeing is that people often make choices in a manner that fails to advance
their own welfare.75 As stated by Matthew Adler, “people can certainly
choose options that have no personal benefit or are personally
detrimental.”76 From a motivational perspective, it is unlikely that all
preferences of human beings are driven by welfare-productive reasons.77
Even when a person’s preferences are generally directed toward what he
or she perceives as being beneficial for himself or herself, various reasons
might cause such preferences to be distorted.78 For instance, people can
72. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1677; Zamir, supra note 64, at 234–35. It should be
stressed that the critical analysis of the preference satisfaction criterion in this Part focuses primarily
on actual preferences. For a discussion of ideal preferences theories, see infra text accompanying
notes 146–160.
73. Bradley A. Harsch, Consumerism and Environmental Policy: Moving Past Consumer
Culture, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 543, 546 (1999).
74. See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT AND MORAL
IMPORTANCE 10 (1986) (“[The actual-desire account] is an influential account. Economists have
been drawn to it because actual desires are often revealed in choices and ‘revealed preferences’ are
observable and hence a respectable subject for empirical science . . . . And both philosophers and
social scientists have been powerfully drawn to it because it leaves no room for paternalism . . . .”);
Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1688 (“Preference theories have the allure of both
antipaternalism and simplicity.”). Lewinsohn-Zamir argues that both attributes are false. Id. at
1689–90.
75. See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1678 (noting that “people may often desire
what is bad for them”). Clearly, this type of objection presupposes the existence of an alternative
criterion of well-being, which enables the formation of external judgments regarding the connection
between preference satisfaction and welfare promotion. Other possible criteria of well-being have
been noted above, supra text accompanying note 68, and will be discussed in detail in infra Part
III. While this Article ultimately recommends the adoption of an objective criterion of well-being
as the basis for innovation law and policy, at this stage of the analysis there is no need to embrace
a specific alternative account of well-being to demonstrate the weaknesses of the preference
satisfaction criterion.
76. Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 241, 263 (2000).
77. Id. (noting that “it is implausible that all reasons motivating preferences are welfareproductive”).
78. For use of the term “distorted preferences” in this context, see Adler & Posner, supra note
11, at 1107.
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be mistaken about their own well-being.79 Such a mistake can be the
result of misinformation,80 or the effect of a careless logical analysis.81
The process of forming one’s preferences might also be flawed in various
manners as a consequence of the inherent limits on cognitive abilities.82
In addition, not all preferences are the result of an organized thought
process—where all relevant information regarding the matter at hand is
taken into account and integrated with background information,
commitments, values, and goals.83 Preferences may be unreflective,84 or
even based on whims.85 Likewise, preferences are sometimes founded
on prejudice; misshaped by various unjust features of the status quo (e.g.,

79. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 11, at 170 (noting that most philosophers of well-being are
prepared to endorse this notion). See also GRIFFIN, supra note 74, at 10 (observing that
“notoriously, we mistake our own interests”), 12 (providing examples for mistakes of fact that lead
to faulty choices of means aimed to serve our long-term goals); Bronsteen et al., Happiness, supra
note 11, at 1586 (“Preference satisfaction is plagued by the fact that people make mistakes, often
preferring and choosing things that fail to make them happy.”); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11,
at 1679 n.45 (“[P]eople may be mistaken about their own interests and desire things that will not
promote their welfare.”); Zamir, supra note 64, at 237 (“A person’s belief that a certain course of
action will yield the greatest happiness for herself may be misconceived.”).
80. See Adler, supra note 76, at 264 (noting that one “problem with the straight preferencebased view of well-being is that preferences can be uninformed, unreflective, nonautonmous, or
otherwise nonideal”); Adler & Posner, supra note 11, at 1114 (referencing an example where a
person prefers one outcome, but if that person had more information, he or she would have preferred
another outcome—).
81. See John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, in UTILITARIANISM
AND BEYOND 39, 55 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, eds., 1982) (noting that preferences may
be based on erroneous factual beliefs, careless logical analysis, or strong emotions that greatly
hinder rational choice).
82. See Zamir, supra note 64, at 238 (noting that common experience and scientific studies
attesting to human fallibility and the existence of significant limits on people’s cognitive abilities
show that people may be mistaken as to what course of action will maximize their well-being). The
following documented systematic errors, for example, may affect the formation of preferences:
misjudgment of the probability that a future risk will be realized; inability to make a correct costbenefit analysis when the data is complex; dependence of decisions on the manner in which data is
presented; consideration of irrelevant factors; ignorance of relevant information; undervaluation of
future benefits and costs in comparison to present ones; ignorance of the incompleteness of data
and the limitations of judgmental skills leading to overconfidence in evaluations and predictions;
and failure to rationally analyze relevant information or examine alternatives. For a comprehensive
list of limits on people’s cognitive abilities (including the foregoing), see id. at 251–52. For a
general account of bounded rationality, see generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974). See
also infra note 100 and accompanying text.
83. See Adler, supra note 76, at 264 (recognizing the problem with one’s preferences absent
such integration).
84. Id.
85. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1678.
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the absence of basic education86); or based on a lack of self-respect or
self-esteem.87 For these and other reasons, the fulfillment of a person’s
preferences will not always advance his or her well-being, and in some
cases, might even reduce it.88
These general observations are certainly applicable in the specific
context of consumer preferences, which might be distorted in any of the
possible ways described above.89 It is also important to recognize that
individual preferences are not formed in a vacuum—preferences in a
market setting are known to be largely affected by social influence that
consumers exert on one another.90 As demonstrated by a series of
interdisciplinary works in complexity and network science, the market
success of a product depends greatly on the structure of the social network
in which it is diffusing.91 As a result, an individual’s decision to purchase
a product might not always rely on such product’s intrinsic qualities.92
Furthermore, advertising and marketing may also have a significant
impact on the formulation of preferences for market products and
services.93
Notably—to the extent consumers are unable to
independently obtain full information about the benefits and costs
associated with products—firms may supply less accurate information,
causing consumers to purchase goods that might be harmful or simply
unnecessary.94 In fact, certain marketing techniques and strategies are
86. Adler & Posner, supra note 11, at 1114. See also GRIFFIN, supra note 74, at 12 (“Sometimes
desires are defective because we have not got enough, or the right, concepts.”).
87. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1672, 1678. See also Adler, supra note 76, at 264
(referring to the related category of “nonautonomous” preferences).
88. See GRIFFIN, supra note 74, at 10 (“It is depressingly common that when even some of our
strongest and most central desires are fulfilled, we are no better, even worse, off.”); LewinsohnZamir, supra note 11, at 1672 (noting that a “fulfillment of a person’s subjective, actual preferences
might result in a reduction—rather than an advancement—of that person’s well-being”).
89. For instance, the systematic errors described in supra note 82 may undoubtedly affect the
formation of consumer preferences.
90. See Michal Shur-Ofry, IP and the Lens of Complexity, 54 IDEA 55, 64 (2013) (discussing
the impact of network dynamics on success).
91. Id. at 66 (noting that “extraordinary success can be random”).
92. See also infra text accompanying notes 125–128 (discussing “positional preferences”).
93. See, e.g., Fisher & Syed, supra note 10, at 677 (discussing the effectiveness of advertising
campaigns in the specific context of pharmaceutical products); Robert P. Merges, Commercial
Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 822–
23 (1988) (discussing the impact of marketing efforts on the economic success of commercialized
technologies). Notably, to the extent patents allow firms to reap supracompetitive profits, this may
enable and motivate them to invest more in lobbing and promoting their patented products while
crowding out other solutions.
94. See, e.g., Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug
Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2007) (noting the concern that some firms
would overstate positive features and understate negative ones in promoting and labeling their
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intentionally designed by businesses to exploit and manipulate
consumers’ cognitive limitations and biases.95 Thus, in addition to the
general factors described above that might account for distorted
preferences, in the context of preferences revealed through individuals’
market choices, additional elements might further weaken the ability to
define well-being in terms of preference satisfaction.
Sure enough, some of the effects described in the preceding paragraph
can be addressed by certain policy measures outside innovation law—for
example, a stricter regulation of advertising and mandatory labeling. By
the same token, when it comes to individuals’ cognitive biases, it may be
possible to employ various de-biasing techniques to steer people in more
rational directions.96 Yet, regulation is far from a perfect solution, and
the effectiveness of debiasing techniques, in particular, has proven to be
limited.97 Because it is not clear to what extent such measures can
significantly mitigate deviations from rationality, one cannot ignore the
effect of such deviations on the manner by which individuals form their
preferences in the marketplace—which ultimately makes the reliance on
preference satisfaction even more troublesome.
All the observations made above with respect to consumer preferences
may surely be relevant with respect to preferences for technological
products and services. A preference for a technological good might be
based on misinformation, misconception, prejudice, or whim.98 A person
might, for example, on a whim, decide to purchase a smartphone as a
replacement for his old mobile phone, without deliberating over the
impact that such a decision could have on various aspects of his wellbeing. While making his decision, he may be affected by similar
products). Interestingly, information asymmetry between producers and consumers may be
particularly acute with respect to innovative technological products, due to their rapid evolution
and inherent complexity.
95. See, e.g., EYAL ZAMIR, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND MORALITY: THE ROLE OF LOSS
AVERSION 55–66 (2015) (describing how suppliers might exploit consumer loss aversion).
96. See generally Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
AND ITS APPLICATIONS 115 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007); Christine Jolls &
Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006).
97. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 40
(2007) (noting that “many debiasing efforts can in fact be counterproductive, due to overcorrection,
rebound effects, or other concerns”).
98. See, e.g., Fisher & Syed, supra note 10, at 677 (discussing specific circumstances that may
render consumers’ decisions in the context of pharmaceutical products uninformed, including
asymmetric knowledge between firms and consumers regarding the benefits and risks of drugs);
James Surowiecki, Technology and Happiness: Why More Gadgets Don’t Necessarily Increase
Our Well-Being, 108 TECH. REV. 72, 74 (2005) (“[M]any decisions about new technologies are
based on little or no concrete evidence and involve guessing about the future.”). See also supra
notes 93–94.

8_TUR-SINAI_DOCUMENT3 (145-204).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

166

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

1/3/2017 1:14 PM

[Vol. 48

decisions made by other individuals in his surroundings as well as the
seller’s massive marketing efforts. It is possible that had he been fully
informed about certain negative implications entailed in using the new
device—including, for the sake of the argument, increased exposure to
radiation, a heightened risk of distraction while driving, and less quality
time with loved ones as a result of intensive use of the device—and made
a reflective decision that took into account such long-term impacts, he
might have preferred to avoid the purchase. Ultimately, satisfying such
an individual’s desire to purchase the product would not necessarily result
in an improvement of his well-being as expected in advance.
This example serves to demonstrate another general deficiency of the
preference satisfaction criterion for well-being: the inherent unavoidable
gap between ex ante expectations and ex post experiences.99 Preferences
necessarily address a future state of affairs and people often cannot
predict their actual experience once such a state is realized. Beyond the
basic inherent difficulty of foreseeing the future, a person’s ability to
make predictions about choices that would maximize one’s well-being is
further limited due to said cognitive biases.100 Generally, individuals are
incapable of assessing the long-term impact of their particular choices on
their well-being.101 Notably, this might still be the case, even if people
formed their preferences after well-informed and careful deliberation of
all possible alternatives and their consequences.102 Thus, an individual
might develop a preference based on an expectation that its fulfillment
will improve his or her life, while his or her actual experience after the
satisfaction of such preference may very well be disappointing.103 In the
99. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1678.
100. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., Happiness, supra note 11, at 1601, 1629 (stating that “when
people are asked to make predictions about the effects of future experiences on their well-being,
they tend to suffer from a number of cognitive and emotional biases”); Daniel Kahneman & Richard
H. Thaler, Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 221, 222
(2006) (noting that people often make systematic errors in predicting their future experience of
outcomes); Zamir, supra note 64, at 237–38 (“[P]eople do not necessarily know better than anyone
else what would maximize their own happiness.”). See also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., Happiness, supra note 11, at 1622 (stating that “there is every
indication that when individuals ‘care about and strive for’ things, they often mistakenly believe
that these things will make them happy”); Melanie Rudd et al., Getting the Most Out of Giving:
Concretely Framing a Proposal Goal Maximizes Happiness 3 (Stan. Graduate Sch. of Bus.,
Working Paper No. 2129, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424103
(noting that “although people often think they know what leads to happiness, their predictions about
what will make them happy are often inaccurate”). See also infra note 123 and accompanying text
(regarding the documented failure of individuals to predict hedonic adaptation effects).
102. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1682 n.58.
103. Id. at 1678. If this is the case, then the fulfillment of desires cannot be guaranteed to
advance well-being, and correspondingly, preference satisfaction cannot serve as a meaningful
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particular context of consumption, while an individual purchasing a
product can generally be assumed to act pursuant to an expectation that
the action will improve his or her well-being—this often ends up far from
being true.
Indeed, an increasing amount of scientific literature attests to the lack
of correlation between consumption and an individual’s positive sense of
well-being.104 Various studies have found that increased wealth in a
given society is generally not accompanied by an increased level of
happiness among its members.105 Likewise, once consumption is no
longer needed to satisfy basic needs—such as adequate shelter, clothing,
and basic nutrition—increased consumption generally does not make
people more content.106 These general observations are certainly valid
with respect to technological products. While technological innovation
has undoubtedly reduced human discomfort and suffering—for example,
by advancing the state of medicine107—there is no evidence that the
fulfillment of consumers’ preferences for various technological products
and services generally make them happier, or otherwise increase their
sense of well-being.108
criterion of well-being. See also Bronsteen et al., Happiness, supra note 11, at 1622 (“Were
individuals able to predict their own future mental states accurately, their preferences might change
quite dramatically.”).
104. See, e.g., Katya Assaf, Buying Goods and Doing Good: Trademarks and Social
Competition, 67 ALA. L. REV. 979, 987–88 (2016) (noting that there is hardly any evidence that
intensive consumption makes people happier); Robert H. Frank, The Frame of Reference as a
Public Good, 107 ECON. J. 1832, 1832, 1836 (1997) (stating that for a broad spectrum of goods,
evidence suggests that beyond some point, consuming more goods does not produce any lasting
increment in people’s sense of well-being).
105. For a review of studies attesting to a lack of correlation between wealth and a sense of
well-being, see David G. Myers, The Funds, Friends, and Faith of Happy People, 55 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 56, 61 (2000) (noting, for example, that in Britain, “sharp increases in the
percentages of households with cars, central heating, and telephones have not been accompanied
by increased happiness”). See also Yew-Kwang Ng, From Preference to Happiness: Towards a
More Complete Welfare Economics, 20 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 307, 313 (2003) (“Studies by
psychologists and sociologists show that, both within a country and across nations, the happiness
level of people increases with the income level, but only slightly.”).
106. See Liselot Hudders & Mario Pandelaere, The Silver Lining of Materialism: The Impact of
Luxury Consumption on Subjective Well-Being, 13 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 411, 413 (2012)
(summarizing the results of such studies). See also supra note 104.
107. See, e.g., Nicholas Rescher, Technological Progress and Human Happiness, in
UNPOPULAR ESSAYS ON TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 3, 5 (1980) (providing, with medicine, the
examples of waste disposal and sanitation and temperature control as areas where science and
technology have contributed to the reduction of human life’s negative aspects).
108. Cf. Derclaye, supra note 6, at 523 (noting that “while technological progress can eliminate
some human discomfort and suffering, that is, the negative aspects of human life, it does not
necessarily follow that it also provides positive aspects or, in sum, happiness”). Note that for the
purposes of this Article, there is no need to embrace a general criticism of the “technological life.”
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Beyond the general factors discussed above that may account for faulty
choices in various cases,109 one possible explanation for the lack of
correlation between consumption and well-being might be that material
rewards alone are not sufficient to make a person happy. Once a person’s
basic needs are met, there are other aspects of life that might be more
influential on that person’s sense of well-being110—such as close
relationships with friends, a satisfying family life, and time to reflect and
pursue diverse interests.111 If time was an unlimited resource, the pursuit
of materialistic goals would not necessarily conflict with the ability to
develop such other aspects of life. But time is a scarce resource, and
hence the efforts required to generate enough income to allow one to
acquire material goods might come at the expense of the ability to
advance other, potentially more vital, aspects of the good life. 112
As for certain technological products and services—such as various
types of electronic gadgets—it might also be the case that the use of the
technology itself would come at the expense of other, potentially more
beneficial, activities—such as spending time with loved ones, being
outdoors, or sleeping more.113 This hypothesis is reinforced by recent
studies showing that certain technological products and services—such
as mobile phones and social networking platforms—are addictive in
nature, which makes it even more likely that their availability would
decrease the time left to engage in other activities.114
It is sufficient to show that the mere satisfaction of a preference for a technological product would
not necessarily advance well-being.
109. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 98.
110. Hudders & Pandelaere, supra note 106, at 415.
111. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, If We Are So Rich, Why Aren’t We Happy?, 54 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 821, 823 (1999). See also Assaf, supra note 104, at 989 (listing leisure, personal
development, and socializing with family and friends as significant factors of well-being); Frank,
supra note 104, at 1838–39 (discussing the increase in happiness levels that results from deeper
social relationships); Myers, supra note 105, at 62–65 (exploring, in addition, the potential
association between religious faith and happiness).
112. See, e.g., Assaf, supra note 104, at 988–89 (noting the concern that overinvestment of time
and energy in pursuing material possessions will undermine opportunities to pursue immaterial
objects); Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 111, at 823 (noting the difficulty to reconcile the conflicting
demands of such goals due to the scarcity of time); Hudders & Pandelaere, supra note 106, at 429
(observing that activities outside the realm of consumption may be more rewarding, but materialists
may not initiate the pursuit of such activities and, as a result, fail to learn how rewarding these can
be). Notably, as there is no market for such immaterial aspects of life, no commercial entities are
investing in promoting them.
113. On the other hand, one can plausibly point out at many technological innovations that have
saved human time.
114. See, e.g., Andrew Hough, Student ‘Addiction’ to Technology ‘Similar to Drug Cravings’,
Study
Finds,
TELEGRAPH
(Apr.
8,
2011),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8436831/Student-addiction-to-technology-similar-
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Another likely reason for the little discernible effect of consumption
on an individual’s sense of well-being might stem from the human
capacity to adapt to changing conditions.115 As stated by psychologist
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi: “If people strive for a certain level of affluence
thinking that it will make them happy, they find that on reaching it, they
become very quickly habituated, and at that point they start hankering for
the next level of income, property, or good health.”116 Hence, even if the
consumption of a new product provides immediate gratification and
increases one’s sense of well-being in the short term—this impact is
likely to be temporary and dissipate quickly. 117 This may put the
consumer on a “hedonic treadmill.”118 Once a person accustoms himself
or herself to the newly acquired possession, the initial pleasure derived
from the acquisition diminishes, and a desire for another possession soon
re-emerges.119
Ultimately, “when expectations outstrip actual
to-drug-cravings-study-finds.html (describing withdrawal symptoms experienced by college
students when deprived of their technology gadgets); Jyoti Ranjan Muduli, Addiction to
Technological Gadgets and Its Impact on Health and Lifestyle: A Study on College Students (2014)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, National Institute of Technology), http://ethesis.nitrkl.ac.in/5544/1/ethesis_19.pdf (examining the use and impact on mental health of technology gadgets among
youths). As documented in these studies, an addiction to technology may have other negative
implications on users’ mental health beyond the lost-time effect. On a related note, some
technologies, by their very nature, substitutes various valuable aspects of human life. Digital
connection, for example, is said to gradually take precedence over direct human contact, and some
argue that this reduces social skills to our detriment. See, e.g., Katherine Bindley, When Children
Text All Day, What Happens To Their Social Skills, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2011, 1:22 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/09/children-texting-technology-socialskills_n_1137570.html (discussing the impact technology gadgets have on young peoples’ ability
to engage in conversation).
115. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 105, at 60 (“Good and bad events do temporarily influence
our moods and people will often seize on such short-run influences to explain their happiness. Yet,
in very little time the emotional impact of significant events and circumstances dissipates.”).
116. Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 111, at 823. See also Myers, supra note 105, at 60 (“Thanks
to our capacity to adapt, yesterday’s luxuries can soon become today’s necessities and tomorrow’s
relics.”).
117. See, e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 111, at 823 (mentioning the “escalation of
expectations” as a reason why material rewards, which people regard so highly, do not necessarily
provide the happiness expected from them).
118. See, e.g., Assaf, supra note 104, at 988 (“[M]aterialistic values associated with
consumerism capture individuals in a so-called hedonic trap, which is hard to escape.”); J. Ian
Norris & Jeff T. Larsen, Wanting More Than You Have and Its Consequences for Well-Being, 12
J. HAPPINESS STUD. 877, 878 (2011) (“[T]he acquisition of material goods places us on a hedonic
treadmill. To the extent that our wants outpace our haves, we might become less happy, even as
our haves accumulate.”).
119. See Hudders & Pandelaere, supra note 106, at 429 (noting that the temporary satisfaction
of material wants may increase the probability that such wants reemerge after a short while); Ng,
supra note 105, at 315 (“[H]igher consumption makes us adapted to the higher level and makes us
needing even higher consumption to remain at the same welfare level.”).
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attainments, even significantly growing attainments, the result is a net
decrease in satisfaction.”120 This phenomenon of “hedonic adaptation”
is certainly applicable to technological products and services. People
instantaneously adapt to available technologies, and, subsequently, a
desire for the next generation quickly takes over.121 The perceived
obsolescence of technological consumer goods is bolstered by product
marketing and advertising designed to convince consumers to repeatedly
buy new and improved versions of the same product to avoid being left
behind.122
Most importantly for this Article’s purposes, researchers noted the
inherent difficulty faced by consumers to anticipate the extent and pace
of their adaptation to different goods and experiences—which might
deepen the wedge between preferences and well-being.123 In fact, such
documented failure of individuals to predict hedonic adaptation effects
might create a bias in favor of consumption that provides an initial
thrill—a strong short-term effect that is easy to forecast, while
disregarding its likely quick dissipation—even though other choices
might prove better in the long run.124
One final explanation for the failure of consumption to serve as a

120. Rescher, supra note 107, at 14. Sure enough, some consumers may derive a direct benefit
from the process of exploring new products. Yet, for other consumers this very process may cause
frustration and diminish their overall sense of well-being. Regardless, with respect to any given
acquisition, a gap may exist between expectations and actual attainments, and this in itself is
problematic in terms of the ability to rely on preferences, as discussed below. See infra text
accompanying notes 123–124.
121. See, e.g., Norris & Larsen, supra note 118, at 878 (providing the example that a “desire for
a better television will create a have-want discrepancy . . . that will only be resolved after the desired
television has been acquired. However, the new television will not lead to any lasting sort of
happiness if we shortly come to want an even better television”); Surowiecki, supra note 98, at 74–
75 (“[N]o matter how dramatic a new innovation is, no matter how much easier it makes our lives,
it is very easy to take it for granted. You can see this principle at work in the world of technology
every day, as things that once seemed miraculous soon become mandate and, worse, frustrating
when they don’t work perfectly.”).
122. See, e.g., Norris & Larsen, supra note 118, at 878 (illustrating this general phenomenon
with respect to cellular phones).
123. BRONSTEEN ET AL., HAPPINESS & THE LAW, supra note 11, at 20. See also Bronsteen et
al., Happiness, supra note 11, at 1600–01 (“Although hedonic adaptation’s effects are substantial,
studies show that people do a poor job of remembering and anticipating adaptation. Accordingly,
they tend to be unsuccessful at predicting certain aspects of an event’s hedonic impact.”); Frank,
supra note 104, at 1839 (noting that “adaptation is inherently difficult to anticipate”).
124. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 104, at 1839 (comparing one’s subjective well-being after
buying a new car and spending more time with friends). Notably, the quick diminishing of the
positive effect of consumption on an individual’s sense of well-being does not characterize
immaterial rewards, such as meaningful relationships. “As relationships continue over time, the
satisfaction they provide tends to increase rather than diminish.” Id.
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lasting source of happiness—contrary to consumer expectations—is the
dependence of individual preferences on one’s position relative to others.
In contrast to what is generally assumed under neoclassical economics,
considerable evidence from psychological and behavioral economics
literature indicates that an individual’s sense of well-being depends
heavily on this individual’s relative position.125 As noted by economist
Robert Frank: “The things we feel we ‘need’ depend on the kinds of
things that others have, and our needs thus grow when we find ourselves
in the presence of others who have more than we do.”126
The importance of relative consumption in individual valuations is
greater in some domains than it is in others, and goods for which relative
position matters most are often termed “positional goods.”127 This
category includes, among other things, luxury goods—such as expensive
food and clothing—and various gadgets and appliances. When it comes
to positional goods, an individual may form a preference to acquire a new
product, while expecting that such a step would have a positive effect on
his or her well-being. Yet, once others in his or her surroundings have
purchased a similar product, this positive effect might be quickly
diminished.128 Also for this reason, there is likely to be a gap between
what one expects ex ante and what one experiences ex post in connection
with certain decisions regarding consumption.
B. Distorted Incentives
For all the reasons discussed above, “while pursuing the ‘good life’
through consumption, people actually stroll away from genuine

125. See, e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 111, at 823 (“When resources are unevenly
distributed, people evaluate their possessions not in terms of what they need to live in comfort, but
in comparison with those who have the most.”); Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause
Large and Preventable Welfare Losses, 95(2) AM. ECON. REV. 137, 137 (2005) (“In traditional
economic models, individual utility depends only on absolute consumption.”); Robert H. Frank &
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 374 (2001)
(explaining that people care about relative position not only because of envy or status anxiety, “but
because the position of others sets a general frame of reference within which economic and social
activity takes place”); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992)
(noting that neoclassical economics has neglected the fact that people desire relative position).
126. Frank, supra note 104, at 1840.
127. Frank, supra note 125, at 137 (defining positional goods as ones for which the link between
context and evaluation is strongest).
128. See, e.g., Assaf, supra note 104, at 989 (“[A]n individual may choose to work longer hours
in order to buy a better car. Yet, once her acquaintances purchase similar cars, the relative
advantage from the new car largely disappears.”); McAdams, supra note 125, at 4 (“[P]arallel
investments by consumers can entirely nullify any positional advantage either hoped to gain by
making the investment.”).
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happiness.”129 Hence, defining well-being in terms of preference
satisfaction is highly problematic.130 This bears significant implications
on the allocative function of the patent system. If individual consumers
cannot be trusted to make choices that increase their own well-being, then
aggregate market demand clearly cannot serve as a good indicator for
social value. Predicated on actual preferences, the patent system
incentivizes the development of certain products and services that might
enjoy market success, but cannot be assumed to have more than a
negligible contribution to the well-being of individual consumers—and
ultimately, to aggregate social welfare. This might be the case, for
example, with respect to certain types of home appliances, cosmetic
products, or electronic gadgets, as well as processes used in the
production of such goods and other associated technologies.131 Thus, the
foregoing analysis regarding the deficiencies of preferences ultimately
provides another strong reason, in addition to those already identified in
the literature, for doubting the ability of a market-based platform to direct
innovation in a socially optimal manner.132
There is one other point worth highlighting associated with the concern
that the patent system may produce distorted incentives.133 While
satisfying the choices of an individual might further his or her personal
well-being (however defined), it could also simultaneously harm other
people or the collective, and thus would not necessarily increase
129. Assaf, supra note 104, at 988 (making this observation in a different context).
130. See supra note 75 (regarding the need to assume the existence of some other criterion of
well-being in order to form such type of judgment). Notably, happiness (or the experience of
pleasure) is not only an essential feature of a hedonistic account of well-being, but is also typically
viewed as one of the qualities comprising the “good life” under an objective criterion of well-being.
See supra text accompanying note 68. Thus, in light of the foregoing findings regarding the lack
of correlation between consumption and happiness, it seems that satisfaction of desires cannot be
trusted to increase well-being in a meaningful way under either of such alternative accounts. See
also infra note 210.
131. As to the indirect effect of market demand on the incentive to develop technologies used
in the production process of consumer goods, see Spulber, supra note 43, at 726 (“Because
technology is an input to production, producers’ demand for the technology is a derived demand—
it depends on the demand for the producers’ final products. Increases in the prices of inventions
can reflect increases in consumer demand for products that are produced using the inventions or
whose design is based on the inventions.”). See also FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 63 (using the
term “derived demand” in referring to societal demand for infrastructure resources (i.e., “inputs
that satisfy demand derived from demand for the outputs”)).
132. For existing critical accounts of the patent system’s allocative function, see supra text
accompanying notes 45–63.
133. It should be noted that the discussion in this paragraph, which concerns the relation
between individual well-being and collective well-being, is not directly related to the criticism of
the preference satisfaction criterion of well-being. In essence, the market failure described herein
could pose a challenge under any account of well-being.
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aggregate social welfare. To the extent that such harmful effects on
others go uncompensated, they are not likely to be a factor in the original
individual’s decision; hence, they might be referred to as negative
externalities.134
One potential negative externality of consumption relates to its
environmental impact. It is widely accepted that greenhouse gases
emitted by humans are the primary driver for climate change; therefore,
many believe that consumption of material goods must be reduced or, at
the very least, channeled toward products with a relatively low
environmental footprint.135
Unfortunately, for various reasons,
consumers cannot be expected to fully internalize environmental
concerns when making market choices.136 A discussion of the possible
manners by which the legal system may strive to reduce market
inefficiencies caused by negative externalities (including in the
environmental context) is outside the scope of this Article’s analysis. But
the important insight for purposes of this Article is that the existence of
such externalities might result in an inflated level of demand for products
with a relatively low net social value (considering their environmental
impact), and further weaken the ability to rely on a market-based platform
as a mechanism that guides innovation in a manner that maximizes
utility.137
Altogether, predicated on market demand, the patent system might
thus incentivize the development, production, and dissemination of
various goods that—regardless of their commercial success—might not
significantly enhance human well-being.138 In some cases, the system
134. For a definition of negative externalities, see, for example, FRISCHMANN, supra note 46,
at 37.
135. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE
CLIMATE (2014) (discussing the connection between capitalism and climate change); ANNIE
LEONARD, THE STORY OF STUFF: HOW OUR OBSESSION WITH STUFF IS TRASHING THE PLANET,
OUR COMMUNITIES, AND OUR HEALTH—AND A VISION FOR CHANGE (2010) (discussing the
impact of excessive consumerism on the environment).
136. Among other things, this is a situation where the observed discrepancy between consumer
preferences and citizen preferences may come into play. See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir,
Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377
(1998) (discussing alternative explanations for this discrepancy).
137. Cf. Frank, supra note 104, at 1843 (“Most economists accept the proposition that market
allocations may be suboptimal when production is accompanied by the discharge of environmental
pollutants.”).
138. Alongside the overconsumption of certain types of products, individual preferences may
also diverge from individual welfare in a manner that leads to under-consumption of certain
products, due to similar factors, including misinformation and the tendency to discount future costs
and benefits. Cf. FRISCHMANN, supra note 46, at 45 (making a similar argument regarding merit
goods, such as education and health care, which are likely to be underprovided by the market). This
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could even generate an incentive to develop technologies with a negative
social value, considering all relevant factors.139 Yet, even if one assumes
that all technological innovations have a net positive value, an inflated
incentive to invest in technologies with a relatively low social value is
sufficiently unfortunate. The main problem associated with such an
overincentive relates to opportunity costs. R&D is often resource
intensive, and because resources are scarce, allocation matters.
Assuming that finding a cure for Alzheimer’s disease is more socially
valuable than developing a new type of a cosmetic product for male hair
loss, then overincentivizing the latter might draw valuable resources
away from the former to society’s detriment.140
The potential for excessive investment in inventive activity has been
identified by various scholars as one of the potential costs of the patent
system.141 Economist Arnold Plant, who affords the most elaborate
treatment to this matter, highlighted the possibility that the patent system
would not only divert resources from noninventive productive activities
to industrial R&D, but also divert resources from various inventive
activities that are not covered by the patent system into attempts to make
patentable inventions.142
could be the case, for example, with respect to certain eco-friendly products, which may come with
a greater up-front cost or involve changing habits, although they entail significant long-term
benefits.
139. In addition to the potential environmental impact, there are numerous potentially harmful
effects of technological innovation that are not discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley,
supra note 1, at 1588 (listing different types of costs that innovation may have in specific domains);
Surowiecki, supra note 98, at 75 (discussing various potential negative impacts of modern
technologies on humans, including loss of privacy and isolation from “the real world”). See also
supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting the addictive nature of certain technologies).
140. For discussion regarding the lack of drugs that effectively treat conditions such as
Alzheimer’s disease, see, for example, Ho, supra note 27, at 429.
141. See, e.g., RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 39 (4th ed. 1992) (noting
that the costs of the patent system include “inducing potentially excessive investment in
inventing”).
142. Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 30,
37, 41 (1934). See also Strandburg, supra note 61, at 94, 108 (discussing the possibility that
university patenting “might skew the choices of research topics toward more applied projects,
threatening the socially beneficial production of the curiosity-driven research demand function”);
Dirk Czarnitzki et al., Heterogeneity of Patenting Activity and Its Implications for Scientific
Research (Ctr. for European Econ. Research, Paper No. 07-028, 2007),
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24591/1/dp07028.pdf (arguing that the effort to generate
patents distracts scientists from their other more fundamentally orientated research tasks). For a
different type of distortion in the patterns of research and development that may result from the
patent system, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57
DUKE L.J. 1693, 1712 (2008) (pointing out that patents may lead to investment of resources directed
at circumventing monopolies (e.g., by designing around) or strengthening monopolies (e.g., by
making interoperability more difficult)). Cf. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure:
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This insight is highly relevant in the context discussed herein, as it
reinforces the importance of basing innovation policy on a sound criterion
of well-being and designing the legal regime in a manner that optimizes
production pursuant to such criterion. By incentivizing innovation, the
system inevitably draws resources away from other productive activities.
To the extent the system incentivizes certain types of innovations with a
relatively low social value, it might fail to serve its utilitarian function of
maximizing social welfare, in light of the potentially higher value of
foregone activities. Such activities may include both noninventive uses
of productive resources and the development of new innovative
technologies with a greater potential to promote social welfare.
The opportunity cost of the patent system might be particularly
noticeable in the domains that have already been identified as susceptible
for systematic underinvestment, as a result of various factors including,
inter alia: the inherent inability of a market-based platform to incentivize
production of non-market goods, the dependence of one’s willingness to
pay for goods with one’s ability to pay, and the fact that some types of
information goods are more difficult to exclude than others.143 All in all,
the resulting system could potentially provide distorted incentives to
innovate in directions that fail to advance societal welfare to the
maximum possible extent. To reduce some of these distortive effects,
certain policy reforms might be warranted. Yet, to better align incentives
to innovate with social value, we must first formulate a new conceptual
framework that relies on an alternative criterion of well-being. Part III
embarks on a quest for such an alternative criterion.
III. A PROPOSED SHIFT TO AN OBJECTIVE CRITERION OF WELL-BEING
A. Available Criteria of Well-Being
As briefly mentioned above, the philosophical literature distinguishes
between various possible accounts of well-being.144

Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 977 n.8 (2002) (“[C]opyright’s incentive effect does not create
more works out of thin air, as it were, but in fact draws resources away from other productive
activities.”).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 45–63 (noting the criticisms of the patent system’s
allocative function). One example for a category of innovations that is most likely
underincentivized by the patent system, for a combination of the aforementioned reasons, is “social
innovation,” a term recently used by Peter Lee in referring to various innovations in fields like
cognitive behavioral therapy, microfinance, and strategies to reduce hospital-based infections. Lee,
supra note 4, at 43–47.
144. See supra text accompanying note 68.

8_TUR-SINAI_DOCUMENT3 (145-204).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

176

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

1/3/2017 1:14 PM

[Vol. 48

1. Preference Theories
Preference theories of well-being, in general, hold that a person’s wellbeing is determined by the extent to which his or her preferences are
fulfilled.145 Due to the widely recognized deficiencies of an account that
relies on actual preferences, many of which have been highlighted above,
philosophers have offered more sophisticated versions of preference
theories. One proposed solution is to shift from actual preferences to
ideal preferences. An ideal preferences theory seeks to advance
preferences that a person would have if he or “she were thoroughly,
clearly, and calmly deliberating all possible alternatives and their
consequences with full, relevant information and no reasoning errors.”146
While successful in correcting certain mistaken preferences—
particularly ones that are based on factual or logical errors—an ideal
preferences theory cannot remedy all deficiencies of actual
preferences.147 For one thing, as an ideal preferences theory focuses on
the hypothetical desires of real human beings, it is doubtful whether it
can remedy choices based on flawed motivations. 148 An ideal
preferences theory also does not purport to alter various features of an
individual’s personality—which might affect his or her preferences. For
instance, a person who suffers from a lack of self-respect or self-esteem
may make choices that would not be viewed by other people as advancing
his or her own well-being—even following a clear and calm deliberation
of relevant information.149 Similarly, economist and philosopher
Amartya Sen discusses the “circumstantial contingency of desires” (i.e.,
the possibility that certain features of the status quo would shape an
individual’s preferences).150 Sen focuses, in particular, on individuals
whose deprivations—due to various types of oppressive circumstances—
might be so great that they “have learned to keep their desires in line with
their respective predicaments,” and concludes that the “purification
procedures” entailed by an ideal preferences theory cannot eliminate this
145. See supra text accompanying note 72.
146. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1680. See also ADLER, supra note 11, at 160
(explaining that idealized preferences are what a person “would be disposed to choose where she
to have more information, be in a calm and deliberate state, and so forth”).
147. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1680–81. See also ADLER, supra note 11, at 171 (“A
substantial number of philosophers suggest that defining well-being in terms of procedurally
idealized preferences is insufficient to capture the critical force of well-being.”).
148. See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1680–81 (doubting the capability of an ideal
preferences theory to remedy malicious and racist preferences).
149. Id.
150. Amartya K. Sen, Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J. PHIL.
169, 191 (1985).
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problem.151 For these reasons, distorted preferences that do not promote
individuals’ welfare might persist even under an ideal preferences
theory.152 Furthermore, the “idealization” process cannot cure the
inherent inadequacy of the preference satisfaction criterion resulting from
the prospectivity of desires.153 Even a fully informed individual, who is
carefully evaluating his or her options, might desire certain things that
would eventually fail to meet his or her expectations.154 In the particular
context of consumer preferences, it is also not clear whether the ideal
conditions would save a hypothetical consumer from being trapped in a
“hedonic treadmill,” which could make him or her biased in favor of
acquisitions that provide strong short-run gratification.155 Likewise, a
hypothetical consumer could also be affected by his or her “relative
position” while forming his or her preferences.156
Thus, the shift from actual preferences to ideal preferences can provide
only a partial solution to the problems associated with the preference
satisfaction criterion of well-being. Though some of those problems
could potentially be addressed while formulating the ideal preferences
theory’s contours,157 the more demanding we are in defining the ideal
conditions under which preferences are formed, the closer we get to an
objective theory of well-being.158 In fact, to answer the question of what
151. Id. See also ADLER, supra note 11, at 172 (“An individual’s history and socialization
might be such that she has adapted to a life which seems to furnish relatively little well-being, and
yet which she prefers—even with good information, reasoning calmly, having formally coherent
preferences, and so forth.”); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1681 (noting, with respect to
individuals with great deprivations, that “[e]ven with adequate information and time for reflection,
their own desires might remain very modest”).
152. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1681. See also JAMES GRIFFIN, VALUE JUDGEMENT:
IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS 22 (1997) (“[A] particularly irrational desire—say, one planted
deep when one was young—might well survive criticism by facts and logic, and its mere endurance
is less than it takes for its fulfillment to make one better off.”); GRIFFIN, supra note 74, at 11 (“[I]t
is doubtless true that if I fully appreciated the nature of all possible objects of desire, I should
change much of what I wanted.”).
153. See supra note 102 and accompnanying text.
154. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1682 n.58 (“Even if we arrive at our preferences
after knowledgeable and careful deliberation of all possible alternatives and their consequences, we
may still be disappointed when we actually experience the satisfaction of our preferences in the
future.”).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 115–124.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 125–128.
157. See generally Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1680 (noting that ideal preference
theories may differ greatly in the content of their ideal conditions).
158. Id. at 1694–95 (explaining that to sufficiently correct the problems associated with
preferences, one cannot avoid employing a certain degree of objectivity in the move from actual to
ideal preferences). See also ADLER, supra note 11, at 159 (noting that “one plausible understanding
of ‘objective goods’ is that these are the items which individuals, under ideal conditions, converge
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one would desire under ideal conditions, it is hard to avoid resorting to a
certain “consensus” regarding objectively valuable objects that
individuals, under ideal conditions, would presumably come to value.
Yet, as illuminated by Sen, “if this is what we are going to do, we could
just as easily have started from the objective criterion itself, and
‘founded’ it on the consensus of values on well-being, rather than having
the imaginary exercise of counterfactual desiring.”159 Clearly, the
stronger the conditions imposed under an ideal preferences theory—in
order to correct the faults in individuals’ actual preferences—the more
the alleged “anti-paternalistic” aspect of preference theories, which
constitutes their main appeal compared to an objective welfare approach,
is compromised. For all these reasons, this Article does not prescribe
embracing an ideal preferences theory as a basis for innovation policy.160
2. Hedonistic Theories
A different family of well-being theories are hedonistic theories, often
referred to as “mental state” theories. Such theories assert that well-being
is determined by the occurrence of certain (positive) kinds of mental
states and the nonoccurrence of other (negative) kinds of mental states.161
Jeremy Bentham, for instance, famously conceived well-being as the
occurrence of pleasure and the avoidance of pain.162 There are also
various other, more sophisticated, versions of mental state theories.163 In
in self-interestedly preferring”).
159. Sen, supra note 150, at 191–92 (noting that while “we can pretend to answer” the question
of what a hypothetical person would desire under ideal conditions, “this is [an] imaginary [exercise]
anyway,” and thus—“we need not live in the fear of being proved wrong”). Notably, as idealized
preferences are not the real desires of the affected subjects, it is not clear how their advancement
could be trusted to promote welfare, unless such preferences attest to the inherent value of the
chosen outcomes. Yet, if this is the case, then attempting to target value in a more direct manner
seems preferable to the fictitious inquiry entailed by an ideal preferences theory. See also infra
text accompanying notes 180–183.
160. Yet, interestingly, the principal policy measures that this Article ultimately recommends
as means to advance an objectivist welfare perspective might also be deemed helpful by those who
adhere to an ideal preferences theory. One way to advance this perspective is to accord a greater
weight to nonpatent mechanisms for incentivizing innovation. See infra Part IV.A. As consumer
demand for patented technologies necessarily reflects actual preferences rather than ideal
preferences, such measure can certainly be useful in advancing an innovation agenda based on an
ideal preferences criterion as well, although the chosen criterion might impact the specific metrics
used in formulating and implementing innovation policy within the framework of such schemes.
See also infra note 198.
161. ADLER, supra note 11, at 162–63; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1675.
162. For a description of Bentham’s conception of well-being, see, for example, ADLER, supra
note 11, at 162–63; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1675–76.
163. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1676; see Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and
Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 62 DUKE L.J. 1509, 1524 (2013) (describing a richer account,
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recent years, there has been a growing interest within economics and
psychology in the study of subjective well-being (“SWB”). Scholars in
the field employ survey data to measure individuals’ SWB—a composite
measure of well-being, generally said to include a cognitive aspect of
one’s satisfaction with life and an affective aspect measured as the
frequency of one’s pleasant and unpleasant emotional experiences.164
Based on such studies, some legal scholars have argued that law and
policy should focus on helping individuals maximize SWB. 165
The main shortcoming of an approach that equates human welfare with
subjective experiences of positive feelings is the potential gap between
the way a person feels and actual reality.166 Correspondingly, many
readers would probably share the intuition that “there is more to wellbeing than how our lives feel from the inside.”167 In this Article’s
context, while various past technological advancements have
undoubtedly served an important role in minimizing human pain and
suffering—and increasing opportunities to experience pleasure168—it
seems rather simplistic to portray technology’s contribution to human
kind in hedonic terms only. Thus, while recognizing the importance of
hedonic states as a major constituent of well-being,169 this Article does
not advocate embracing a mental-state criterion of well-being as the sole
factor directing innovation. A more comprehensive concept—which
views well-being as a combination of various factors, of which happiness
only forms a part—seems more adequate.170
under which “an individual’s well-being depends not only upon her pains and pleasures, but also
upon her attainment of high quality nonhedonic mental states (for example, having good memories,
cognitions, or perceptions) and her avoidance of low-quality nonhedonic mental states”).
164. For sources discussing “subjective well-being,” see, for example, ADLER, supra note 11,
at 165; Frank, supra note 104, at 1832; Hudders & Pandelaere, supra note 106, at 413.
165. For a prominent account of this approach, see generally BRONSTEEN ET AL., HAPPINESS &
THE LAW, supra note 11; Bronsteen et al., Happiness, supra note 11; Bronsteen et al., Well-Being
Analysis, supra note 11. But see Adler, supra note 163 (expressing skepticism as to the ability to
rely on the results of surveys employed by SWB scholars).
166. See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1677 (“Well-being is determined not only
by what we feel, but also by what we are and what we do in reality.”).
167. Id. See also Derclaye, supra note 12, at 198 (maintaining that “happiness should not be
the only goal of government”); Harsanyi, supra note 81, at 54 (“It is by no means obvious that all
we do we do only in order to attain pleasure and to avoid pain.”).
168. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., infra note 200 and accompanying text (supporting the use of studies regarding
the impact of technology on SWB as an input for innovation policy under the proposed objective
approach).
170. Notably, the principal policy measures recommended in this Article, see infra Part IV, may
be found useful in advancing a hedonistic approach as well, although the adoption of such
perspective would necessitate assigning a greater weight to SWB studies in formulating and
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3. Objective Theories
This leads us to the final main theoretical approach: objective wellbeing. The objective approach conceives well-being as the fulfillment of
a nonexhaustive list of qualities, which are intrinsically valuable for
people (“objective list”).171 Under such an account, well-being is not
reduced to mental states or to the satisfaction of preferences, but rather
determined by objective external standards.
Overall, there is considerable agreement among various contemporary
philosophers regarding the content of the objective list that the state
should promote.172 For instance, one value that is widely regarded by
objective theorists as a basic constituent of well-being is autonomy and
liberty, which include the ability to determine “one’s own course in life
and the freedom to act according to one’s choices.”173 To attain
autonomy and liberty one must, as a basic condition, be in a state of
physical and mental health, which requires, among other things: adequate
levels of nutrition, health, and sanitation; freedom from anxiety and pain;
and sufficient material goods, such as shelter and household property. 174
Other qualities often incorporated in objective lists include:
understanding or knowledge about oneself and about the world,
accomplishment (of worthwhile goals), deep and meaningful social
relationships, experiencing pleasure and satisfaction in different aspects
of life, and being able to enjoy beauty or nature.175
Notably, the “goods” on the list are defined in a very broad manner,
allowing sufficient flexibility and pluralism rather than prescribing a
rigid, identical set of goods for everyone.176 For example, various
implementing innovation policy.
171. ADLER, supra note 11, at 165. See also GRIFFIN, supra note 74, at 40–55 (providing a
general description of objective accounts of well-being); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11
(advancing an objective-welfare approach to property law).
172. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1702 (“Although no unanimously agreed-upon
list exists, there is considerable overlap between the various objective theories of well-being.”). Cf.
Fisher, supra note 12, at 1468 (noting that the sets of conditions commended by various visions of
the “good life” are not identical, but “the overlap between them is striking”). As a specific example
for an objective account of well-being, consider John Finnis’s list, which includes life, knowledge,
play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion. JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 85–90 (1980). For other examples of objective lists offered
by various contemporary philosophers, see ADLER, supra note 11, at 166–67. Amartya Sen’s work
on welfare is also often considered to rely on an objectivist conception. See, e.g., ADLER, supra
note 11, at 169; Bronsteen et al., Happiness, supra note 11, at 1602–03.
173. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1703–04.
174. Id. at 1704.
175. Id. at 1704–05.
176. Id. at 1706–07. See also GRIFFIN, supra note 74, at 54 (discussing the flexibility embedded
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individuals can attain the value of accomplishment in very different
ways.177 In addition, it should be stressed that even under an objective
theory, preferences and mental states are not entirely irrelevant. 178 As
mentioned above, the value of autonomy and liberty is widely
acknowledged as an objective good—which means that a person’s desires
regarding his or her own well-being matter a great deal—whereas
pleasure is also commonly recognized as an important element of wellbeing. In other words, an objective theory still ties an individual’s wellbeing to his or her own life experiences. But pleasures and desires are
only part of the picture under an objective account—which ultimately
assumes the ability to judge well-being by an external standard that is not
necessarily dependent on a person’s subjective preferences or
experiences. Indeed, this feature of an objective theory forms the basis
for the main argument against it. In constraining the role of subjective
judgment—and implying that others might sometimes be better judges of
another person’s well-being—an objective theory of well-being could be
said to invite less neutrality from the state in promoting people’s welfare
in a manner that might amount to excessive paternalism. After exploring
the potential of adopting an objective theory of well-being as a basis for
innovation law, this potential criticism shall be addressed.179
B. An Objectivist Theory of Technological Innovation
Due to the inadequacy of preferences and mental states to serve as
satisfactory definitions of well-being, an objective criterion seems to be
the most appropriate one for the state to employ in directing technological
innovation. In the specific context of innovation policy, beyond the
general advantages of such a comprehensive and holistic criterion over
rival criteria, an objective criterion reinstates a concept of technological
progress as a means to achieve valuable ends, rather than as an end in
itself.180 This might actually fit the basic intuition shared by many
members of the public regarding technology. When asked how
technology improves human life, people are likely to point to specific
aspects in which technology enables them to live a better life—for

in an objective account).
177. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1707.
178. ADLER, supra note 11, at 167. See also Bronsteen et al., Happiness, supra note 11, at 1603
n.86 (“All objective accounts of welfare retain a substantial role for subjective experience.”);
Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1701 (“Objective-theory advocates do not argue that people’s
preferences or pleasures are unimportant in assessing their well-being.”).
179. See infra Part V.
180. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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example, by advancing the state of medicine or by enabling cross-global
communication. This point relates to a general notion associated with
preferences (either actual or ideal) that has not yet been discussed. As
pointed out by Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, equating “the good with the
satisfaction of our wishes implies that the act of desiring confers value on
the object of desire.”181 Yet, this is false. People want something
because it is valuable to them for some external reason that generally
precedes their desire.182 When someone purchases a technological
product, he or she does it because this product presumably has some value
to him or her; but the mere decision to buy the product does not explain
the source of the value. While preferences might serve as evidence for
value, they do not always signal value in an accurate manner, as
demonstrated above. Therefore, it is important to look beyond
preferences and try to identify valuable technologies in a more direct
manner. Embracing an objective theory of well-being as a foundation for
innovation law would provide a theoretical framework where this exact
type of inquiry could take place.183
On a conceptual level, embracing an objective criterion of well-being
as a foundation to innovation policy means that one can no longer treat
technological innovation in a so-called neutral way. Different innovative
directions have different social values—and, hence, there is a need to find
agreeable ways to evaluate such relative values, set an order of priorities,
and provide incentives to innovate accordingly. As a starting point, it is
important to agree on a list of “objective goods.”184 As explained above,
the objective constituents of well-being can be widely agreed upon.185
Hence, this initial stage in formulating an objective theory of valuable
technologies should not pose great difficulty.186
Assuming the content of the “objective list” could be agreed upon, the
system then ought to be designed in a manner that channels resources—
181. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1684.
182. Id. See also GRIFFIN, supra note 74, at 17 (“What makes us desire the things we desire,
when informed, is something about them—their features or properties.”).
183. Notably, this Article does not explore the potential role of IP rights as a means to attain
“objective goods” from the inventor’s perspective. While this is an interesting question that can
have significant implications on the proper design of IP rights, cf. Fisher, supra note 12, the analysis
herein stays within the traditional framework, which conceives IP rights as an instrument to produce
utility (for others) and does not concern itself with the well-being of inventors and creators as such.
184. Whereas the values on an objective list, in and of themselves, cannot yield particular policy
prescriptions, such list may still serve an important role as the overarching framework for
formulating an objectivist innovation agenda. Subsequently, this Article shall discuss certain tools
that can assist policy makers in making more nuanced decisions within such general framework.
185. See supra text accompanying note 172.
186. Adequate development of an objective account of well-being is clearly beyond the scope
of an article on patent law.
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to the maximum possible extent—toward innovations that have the
greatest potential to enable individuals to attain such qualities. The
challenge is to identify these welfare-enhancing technologies. At first
glance, the fundamental values comprising an objective list might seem
overly flexible and inclusive to allow such inquiry. While analyzing any
innovative product or service, one could plausibly point out a potential
link to one of the values on the list. Yet, in certain cases, it seems that
direct value judgments could be made with a reasonable degree of
conviction. Some types of technological advances in particular are
clearly more “objectively” valuable than others in terms of their abilities
to enable realization of the welfare-enhancing values on the list, and thus
should arguably be assigned a higher priority under an objective
approach.
This would be the case, for instance, in regard to certain advances in
medical technology—which allow people suffering from illnesses to live
healthier (and sometimes longer) lives, and thus enable them to preserve
autonomy and liberty, while making it easier for them to attain other
goods on the list as well.187 As another case in point, consider
innovations designed to assist people with disabilities. New research in
robotics might result in solutions that would make disabled persons’ lives
much easier in a variety of ways. 188 Similarly, recent developments in
the field of artificial vision already produce, and may continue to yield, a
variety of solutions assisting the visually impaired.189 Such technologies
could facilitate ongoing enhancement of affected individuals’ daily lives
and significantly increase their chances to obtain various “objective
goods”—including, for example, the values of understanding,
accomplishment, and experiencing pleasure. Likewise, innovations
aimed at reducing hazardous substances from consumer products—for
instance, nontoxic cleaning materials—affect the health of individual
187. Clearly, some advances in the field may need to be assigned a much higher priority than
others. For example, one cannot compare the utility involved in a new drug that treats an emerging
global infectious disease to the one associated with a drug that is designed to alleviate the symptoms
of seasonal allergy sufferers, particularly if the latter is a reformulation of existing drugs with only
minor benefits in drug delivery and no increased therapeutic potential. For an argument that the
current legal regime encourages pharmaceutical firms to focus on incremental innovations, rather
than on breakthrough drugs, see Ho, supra note 27, at 12; Love & Hubbard, supra note 27, at 1520,
1523.
188. For example, a robotic wheelchair guided by the user’s head movements might be able to
assist elderly and disabled patients with limited hand functionality. For a detailed description of
this project and various other examples, see NIH Funds Robots to Assist People with Disabilities,
NAT. INSTS. OF HEALTH (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/dec2014/nibib-08.htm.
189. See, e.g., ORCAM, www.orcam.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) (describing a visual aid
innovation that improves the lives of those that are seeing impaired).
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users, and thus enable them to live better lives, while simultaneously
benefitting the general state of the environment. As a general matter,
innovations aimed at mitigating climate change—or otherwise improving
the state of the environment—must be highly prioritized while setting an
objectivist agenda for R&D, in light of their potential significant impact
on the well-being of numerous individuals.
These examples of innovation categories that might have a particularly
high potential to enable better lives are certainly not meant to be
exhaustive. Most importantly, some of these innovations are not
adequately incentivized under a system predicated on preference
satisfaction, and hence the shift to an objective theory might have
important practical implications.190
At the same time, certain innovative directions that receive strong
encouragement under the current market-based approach should
presumably be assigned a relatively low priority under an objective
approach. This might be the case regarding certain types of luxury
products—for example, newly improved versions of electronic gadgets—
that could potentially face a highly inflated demand due to hedonic
adaptation, relative preferences, and other factors discussed above.
While the acquisition of such goods might offer an immediate sense of
gratification and their use could allow people to perform some new
functions and possibly make life more comfortable in various manners,
they evidently fail to provide any lasting increase in well-being, and the
link between them and the ability to attain the welfare-enhancing values
on an objective list is arguably weaker. Thus, under an objective
approach, the state might need to provide lower incentives to invest in the
development of such products.191
Beyond prioritizing certain innovative directions relative to other
endeavors, an innovation agenda predicated on an objectivist approach
might also comprise some more general considerations. For example, in
addition to the need to encourage the development of designated “green
technologies,” there might be a need to recognize environmental impact
as a general factor to be weighed in connection with the state’s decisions
regarding innovation funding.192 Another consideration that could play
190. This is the case, for example, with medications for diseases that primarily affect the poor.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text (describing the underincentive to develop such
medications under a market-based approach).
191. Notably, even under the approach advanced by this Article, incentives to invest in such
endeavors may still exist and consumers may certainly opt to purchase the ensuing products and
services. See also infra text accompanying note 273.
192. For a potential venue for such a consideration, see infra note 237 and accompanying text.
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a role in setting an objective innovation agenda is the potential for a
certain technology to serve as a basis for follow-on innovation. As noted
above, the social value of an invention is often comprised not only of its
stand-alone value, but also of its contribution to subsequent
developments.193 The potential to serve as a platform for future
innovation exists—to some extent—with respect to any type of
innovation. Yet, some inventions clearly have greater capacity to spur
follow-on research and development. This is the case, for example, with
respect to basic technologies that can serve as the foundation for a variety
of applications in multiple technological fields.194 A similar capacity is
shared by “research tools,” which are customarily defined as “products
or processes used in research to investigate subjects other than the tools
themselves.”195 When a prospective technology of this type is
considered, the state should arguably be more generous in securing
funding for its development in light of the difficulty to foresee the
potential welfare-enhancing downstream developments relying on such
technology.196
The directions identified above demonstrate certain potential
applications of an objective welfare approach to innovation policy.
Needless to say, forming direct value judgments regarding the ability of
various technological advances to promote social welfare is not always
an easy (or even feasible) task; and the values involved in comparisons
between different potential R&D projects might often not be
commensurable. Thus, it is important to attempt to develop some specific
guidelines and decision-making procedures that could assist policy
makers in formulating and implementing an objectivist innovation
agenda in a consistent and coherent manner.
Among other things, it seems that assessing the input from a wide
variety of sources could be useful in acertaining the social value of
different technologies and prioritizing between potential R&D projects.
193. Supra note 54 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION, supra note 54, at 127–29, 132 (providing laser
technology as an example for such basic technology); Carmen Matutes et al., Optimal Patent
Design and the Diffusion of Innovations, 27 RAND J. ECON. 60, 60–61 (1996) (surveying other
examples of basic technologies with a variety of applications).
195. Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experimental Use and
Research Tools, 48 IDEA 123, 124–25 (2007–2008).
196. At the same time, while incentivizing the development of such technologies, the state
should attempt preserving wide access to follow-on inventors. This concern supports incentivizing
upstream research via nonpatent institutions. To the extent incentives are provided via the patent
system, relevant patent doctrines should be harnessed to secure access. For a proposed policy
reform designed to ensure such a result, see generally Tur-Sinai, supra note 32.

8_TUR-SINAI_DOCUMENT3 (145-204).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

186

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

1/3/2017 1:14 PM

[Vol. 48

Such sources could include historical studies regarding observed impacts
of various past technologies on human welfare as well as empirical (and
other) studies exploring the effects that various contemporary
technologies might have on individual users’ well-being.197 Studies of
individual preferences could also be valuable as an indication for
directions worth pursuing, though they should not have a decisive role
under an objective theory of well-being.198 In addition, as pleasure is a
widely recognized component of human flourishing under an objective
account of well-being,199 data regarding the impact of various
technologies on happiness or other components of SWB could be utilized
as well.200 Finally, it might be possible—with the assistance of experts
in particular fields of technology—to identify specific indicators of social
value that could be used to assess and compare different potential
endeavors within such given fields.201
197. See, for example, the studies referred to in supra note 114. For other works investigating
the impact of current-day technologies on individual and social welfare, see generally
TECHNOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING (Yair Amichai-Hamburger, ed., 2009); THE
GOOD LIFE IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (Philip Brey et al. eds., 2012).
198. A method frequently used to estimate people’s preferences for non-market goods is
contingent valuation (“CV”) surveys that ask people how much they would be willing to pay to
receive the associated benefits. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., Happiness, supra note 11, at 1629
(discussing CV surveys). While various problems that apply to market preferences could attach to
responses elicited by CV surveys as well (including, for example, the potential for mistakes
resulting from the inherent prospectivity of preferences), individuals participating in such surveys
may be less subject to the potentially distortive impact of certain factors present in the marketplace.
At any event, studies indicating consumer preferences should not be accorded a conclusive weight
under an objective welfare approach but rather be used in tandem with other indicators of social
value. Arguably, if the chosen criterion of well-being were ideal preferences, then this measure
would need to be assigned a greater weight.
199. See supra text accompanying note 175.
200. See ADLER, supra note 11, at 297 (noting that “happiness surveys could be used at the
predictive stage: in predicting what outcome (or, more precisely, probability distribution over
outcomes) a given policy is associated with”). As the scientific interest in the study of SWB grows,
various new methods to measure happiness are being developed and employed by economists and
psychologists. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., Happiness, supra note 11, at 1596, 1630 (arguing that by
using such methods, governments could “measure and quantify the likely hedonic effects of
potential projects and policies”). One of these particularly promising methods is the moment-bymoment experience sampling method. For further discussion of this method, see id. at 1596–97;
Derclaye, supra note 12, at 183.
201. As an example, consider a bill proposed in 2005 for the creation of a fund to reward
innovators who develop new pharmaceuticals. Under the bill, the size of the reward would be based
upon evidence of certain parameters, including, inter alia: (1) the number of patients who benefit
from the drug, (2) the incremental therapeutic benefit of the drug compared to existing drugs
available to treat the same condition, and (3) the degree to which the drug addresses priority health
care needs (as defined in the bill). The Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2005, H.R. 417,
109th Cong. (2005). For a further discussion, see Hubbard & Love, supra note 27, at 1532–34.
The bill was never enacted.
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As a general matter—due to the dynamic nature of science and
technology—the inquiry underlying an objective welfare approach to
innovation policy must be of an ongoing nature, and constant fine tuning
of policy measures might be warranted to produce satisfactory results.
Notably, while formulating an objectivist innovation agenda, there might
be differences between various countries that face different problems and
have diverse needs and priorities.202 Sure enough, individuals might
receive a chance to be involved and impact a country’s innovation agenda
via participation in the political process, where their citizen preferences,
rather than consumer preferences, come into play.203
The foregoing proposed guidelines are certainly not meant to be
exhaustive,204 and the challenges associated with developing and
implementing an objective approach to innovation are largely left open
for further exploration by scholars and policy makers. Despite the
challenging nature of the inquiry, giving up on the attempt to formulate
alternative measures of worth altogether could be highly unfortunate. A
continued deliberation on the matter—fostered by this Article’s proposed
conceptual change—might yield creative solutions to the challenges
involved in assessing the social value of technology.
To illustrate, one context from which one could potentially draw
insights in developing measures for valuing innovations is the field of
202. Notably, in setting priorities among various innovative endeavors under an objective
approach, the state could also choose to take into account certain non-utilitarian considerations,
including distributive justice concerns. In fact, policy measures designed to maximize well-being
according to an objective criterion may often address distributive concerns as well. See LewinsohnZamir, supra note 11, at 1708–09. For an example of a context where the considerations under an
objective-welfare perspective and a distributive-justice perspective may converge, at least to an
extent, consider the Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97–414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). Orphan drugs are drugs that treat rare
diseases. Because so few individuals are affected by such diseases, such drugs may only generate
small revenues in comparison to R&D costs, which is why the state employs a special scheme in
an attempt to secure incentives for their development. See also supra note 47. While generally
justified in terms of distributive justice, the Orphan Drugs Act can also be explained in utilitarian
terms once we shift to an objective criterion that recognizes the particularly high value of such
drugs for the lives of affected individuals. Cf. Arti K. Rai, Pharmacogenetic Interventions, Orphan
Drugs, and Distributive Justice: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y FOUND.
246, 254–55 (2002) (employing a cost-benefit analysis and demonstrating that orphan drugs may,
at times, produce health benefits that commensurate with their costs). At any event, the increased
role of the state in directing innovation under an objective approach may allow factoring in
distributive justice considerations more easily.
203. See generally Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 136 (discussing the distinction between
citizen preferences and consumer preferences).
204. For additional proposals that focus more on the procedural aspects of the decision-making
process, see generally infra Part IV. For instance, employing peer review under a grants scheme
may enhance the ability to identify the most promising proposals. See infra note 231.
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public health—where certain tractable metrics for welfare have been
developed and implemented in making policy decisions. One such
measure is the “quality-adjusted life year” (“QALY”).205 Under a
QALY-based approach, a medical intervention is evaluated according to
the additional life years it yields multiplied by a factor representing
quality of life, which can range from zero (0) (representing a health state
no better than death) to one (1) (representing perfect health).206 Many
Western countries use QALYs as a tool to evaluate the cost effectiveness
of medical interventions to determine which ones should be covered
under their national healthcare systems.207 The QALY measure could
potentially be used in connection with innovation policy as well, in
facilitating a comparison between various R&D projects that address
diverse medical conditions.208 Similar metrics for welfare that consider
other factors beyond health could potentially be developed in the future
to assist policy makers in evaluating and prioritizing among various
technological advances in other fields as well.209
Notwithstanding the early stage of the inquiry, Part IV of this Article
explores certain normative implications that the shift to an objective
criterion of well-being might entail.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
As a general matter, an objective welfare perspective calls for a more
interventionist approach.210 To ensure better alignment between social
values and incentives to innovate, the state should assume a greater role,
not only in setting the agenda for innovative activity, but also in
implementing such an agenda. This Part discusses two principal
directions that might facilitate such increased involvement of the state in
directing innovation: (1) according greater weight to alternative
205. For another similar measure, see Fischer & Syed, supra note 10, at 613–18 (discussing the
World Health Organization’s Disability Adjusted Life Years measure used to assess impact of
diseases in the global health context).
206. See, e.g., Jennifer D. Cape et al., Introduction to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Clinicians,
90 U. TORONTO MED. J. 103, 104 (2013).
207. Rai, supra note 12, at 127.
208. See also infra note 240 and accompanying text.
209. The World Health Organization’s Quality of Life (“WHOQOL”) index may serve as an
example for a more comprehensive index, although it is doubtful whether it can be implemented
on a policy level. For discussion, see Rai, supra note 12, at 126–27.
210. The analysis in supra Part II demonstrated that consumption does not necessarily advance
happiness. Thus, a market-based platform cannot even be trusted to produce a signal that optimizes
production under a hedonic account. The market mechanism is surely not sensitive enough to
accommodate other concerns and promote other values encompassed in the more holistic definition
of well-being entailed by an objective approach. See also supra note 130.
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institutions designed to incentivize innovation; and (2) fine tuning the
patent system itself.
To some extent, an objective well-being perspective for valuing
technologies might constitute an existing feature of the system. The state
already employs various mechanisms to incentivize innovation alongside
the patent system.211 When providing direct funding for different
innovative projects, the government undoubtedly relies, to some extent,
on the potential objective value of the innovations at hand.212 In such
instances, the objective theory of well-being might serve an important
interpretive role by offering a general normative framework within which
various policies and decisions could be grounded. Yet, the explicit
embracement of objective standards of well-being as the basis for
innovation policy mandates implementing such directions in a manner
that is much more systematic, consistent, and encompassing.
A. Greater Reliance on Alternative Institutional Mechanisms
Patents are not the only available mechanisms to stimulate
innovation.213 One alternative is prizes (i.e., monetary rewards provided
to the first person to deliver a specified invention).214 Similar to patents,
the reward under a prizes scheme is provided ex post (i.e., upon
successful completion of the project).215 Though prize administrators
commonly fix the reward in advance,216 various scholars have advocated
for the use of sales data—or other proxies of the invention’s actual
impact—in setting the size of the prize.217 Another alternative used to
211. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at 316 (noting that the “federal government
currently uses prizes, patents, grants, and tax credits to incentivize the invention and
commercialization of new technologies”).
212. This may be particularly true in respect of medical innovations, where calculations of
disease burden are often used for purposes of a cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 202,
at 258, 261.
213. For a discussion of alternative mechanisms, see generally Michael Abramowicz,
Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Frischmann, supra note 55; Gallini &
Scotchmer, supra note 44; Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36; Steven Shavell & Tanguy van
Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001); Wright, supra
note 4.
214. For sources discussing prizes as an incentive mechanism, see, for example, Gallini &
Scotchmer, supra note 44, at 53; Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at 311; Kapczynski & Syed,
supra note 29, at 1904.
215. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at 308.
216. Id. at 318.
217. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 213, at 176–77 (discussing the advantages of basing
rewards on sales); Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation,
113 Q. J. ECON. 1137 (1998) (proposing an ex post patent buyout mechanism that uses an auction
in order to elicit information regarding the value of the invention); Shavell & van Ypersele, supra
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incentivize production of information goods is grants or other forms of
direct government funding via, for instance, cooperation agreements or
procurement.218 As a final example, the government can stimulate
innovation by offering refundable tax credits for R&D.219 Despite its
robust use in practice,220 this mechanism has largely been neglected in
the literature that investigates innovation-funding schemes.221
While economists and legal scholars generally conceive patents as the
primary means for promoting innovation,222 in recent years there has
been a reemerging scholarly interest in the foregoing alternative
mechanisms.223 As further explained below, the deficiencies of the
preference satisfaction criterion of well-being support the need to afford
a greater role to nonpatent incentive schemes within the innovation ecosystem. At the same time, the more the government uses such schemes
in practice, the more vital it is to adopt a conceptual framework on which
such practices can be based, and to continue the attempt to develop
rigorous objective metrics for assessing the social value of technologies
that would assist policy makers in their decision making.
The main virtue generally attributed to the foregoing funding
mechanisms is their potential to finance innovation while avoiding the
deadweight loss resulting from noncompetitive pricing of patented
inventions.224 Yet, one of the major difficulties associated with such
note 213, at 541 (proposing the use of sales data by the government).
218. Under this category, the literature also typically addresses direct spending on research
carried out by government agencies. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 55, at 387–88; Hemel &
Ouellette, supra note 36, at 320–21; Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 29, at 1904. For a survey of
different forms of direct governmental funding of innovation, see generally Danielle ConwayJones, Research and Development Deliverables Under Government Contracts, Grants,
Cooperative Agreements and CRADAs: University Roles, Government Responsibilities and
Contractor Rights, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 181 (2004–2005).
219. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at 309.
220. Id. at 306 (noting that “the United States and other industrialized economies dole out tens
of billions of dollars’ worth of tax credits each year for research and development”).
221. For a recent thorough analysis of this mechanism, see id. See also Shawn P. Mahaffy, The
Case for Tax: A Comparative Approach to Innovation Policy, 123 YALE L.J. 812 (2013). Another
mechanism used by the state, particularly in the field of pharmaceuticals, is regulatory protection,
primarily by means of data exclusivity. For a discussion, see, for example, Ho, supra note 27, at
495–99. The United States Congress has previously used data exclusivity to incentivize desired
innovation in specific areas, such as drugs for children and antibiotics. Id. at 493 n.335.
222. See supra text accompanying note 36.
223. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at 305 (describing this trend). One other
possible approach to encourage production of knowledge that has recently gained much scholarly
attention is common-based production. For simplicity reasons, this Article shall not discuss this
approach.
224. See, e.g., id. at 381 (“Prizes and grants also avoid the deadweight losses associated with
patent monopolies.”); Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 44, at 54 (“Monopoly pricing is equivalent
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mechanisms is the need for the government to allocate funding without
access to information regarding the “costs and benefits of R&D
investments.”225 As noted above, the common approach in the literature
considers patents superior to other mechanisms in their ability to use
private information to direct innovation.226
In addition, direct
government funding of innovation might involve the risks of
politicization, regulatory capture, and mismanagement.227
But the informational advantage of the patent system over
government-set awards might be overstated. The government certainly
has a greater role under non-IP schemes; yet, decision makers have ample
opportunity to retrieve input from researchers and industry players
throughout the process. For instance, under a prizes scheme, the
government generally sets innovation targets, but it does not dictate the
specific directions that should be pursued in search of a solution and it
leaves such directions open for exploration by the potential candidates
themselves.228 Even in setting targets, the government can employ a
relatively low degree of specificity and permit creativity on behalf of
innovators in choosing projects.229 With respect to grants, researchers
are typically invited to submit proposals for R&D projects under broad
categories set by the administrator,230 and various mechanisms—
including, most importantly, peer review—are employed to identify the
most promising proposals.231 Interestingly, even Demsetz—in a notto taxing a single market, which is generally thought to impose greater deadweight loss than the
broad-based taxation that generates general revenue.”).
225. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 44, at 54–55.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 40–44. See also Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at
327 (summarizing the traditional argument according to which, “[g]overnment-set rewards are
inefficient when the government cannot foresee a potential invention or evaluate its costs and
benefits”).
227. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at 327. See also Frischmann, supra note 55, at 361 n.45
(discussing the need to recognize public choice concerns regarding regulatory capture by special
interest groups).
228. Cf. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 29, at 1954 (distinguishing between setting innovation
targets and finding the most promising lines of attack).
229. Admittedly, though, the lower the degree of specificity in setting the prize criteria, the
more uncertainty market players have as to their chances to win the prize and, therefore, a lower
incentive to assume the risk.
230. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 55, at 388 (“Grants are often employed to support or
stimulate innovation without a predetermined application or result in mind.”); Gallini & Scotchmer,
supra note 44, at 56 (noting that for medical research, the sponsor may solicit open-ended
proposals). In instances where funding is dedicated in advance to highly specific causes, it is often
the case that the government indeed holds superior information regarding the value of the project.
Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 44, at 55 (noting, as an example, the case of military wares, where
the sponsor actually defines the investment’s prospective value).
231. Peer review is central in funding decisions regarding basic research. As illuminated by
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often-cited part of his seminal article advocating the superiority of the
patent system—acknowledged that there are ways for governments to
make informed decisions while funding innovation: “Surveys of
scientists and managers could be taken and a weighting scheme could be
applied to the opinions received; no doubt there are many other ways of
making such decisions.”232 As to the risk of politicization and regulatory
capture affecting the decision-making process, it should be noted that
such concerns exist in the “patent district” as well, where the legislature
is subject to intense pressure on behalf of interest groups.233
Most importantly, as this Article demonstrates, market demand—the
main source of information that the patent system relies on in
incentivizing information—does not accurately reflect social value.
Once one recognizes the problems associated with the preference
satisfaction criterion of well-being, the alleged informational advantage
of the patent system seems all the more doubtful, and the justification for
considering an increased role for alternative schemes becomes stronger.
In fact, once moving from preference satisfaction to an objective criterion
of well-being, government-set awards could have an advantage over a
market platform in facilitating a greater role for the government in setting
and implementing innovation policy.234 Hence, what is generally
considered a problem under the prevailing approach might hold promise
under the proposed new framework.
Notably, this Article does not recommend substituting patents with
government-set awards; yet, it does endorse increasing the weight
assigned to these alternative schemes alongside the patent system to
improve the link among incentives to innovate and their social value. The
primary function of government-set awards should be to strengthen
incentives to produce innovations that might be underincentivized by the
patent system, either because of their own inherent characteristics or as a
result of the overincentive provided by the patent system to other less
Katherine Strandburg, while it “is widely seen as a mechanism of quality control,” peer review “is
also a mechanism for determining the scientific ‘demand’ for particular research projects.”
Strandburg, supra note 61, at 97, 119 n.17. This observation regarding the allocative role of the
peer review process in regards to basic research may be applicable, at least to some extent, with
respect to applied research as well.
232. Demsetz, supra note 41, at 12.
233. See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology’s Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 325 (2006) (noting that the biotechnological industry is
against virtually all of the major proposed reforms to patent law that would weaken patents or
restrict the rights of patent holders); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the
Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1353, 1359–61 (2009) (discussing the lobbying efforts on
behalf of pharmaceutical companies in order to maintain a strong patent system).
234. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (regarding the need to increase the state’s role
in directing innovation under an objective approach).
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valuable innovations.
Whereas the shift to an objective-welfare perspective supports an
increased role for direct funding schemes, the existing use of such
schemes by the state—which tends to be piecemeal—stresses the need to
formulate an overall evaluative framework. The use of objective metrics
for evaluating technologies—developed in accordance with the
guidelines proposed in this Article, within the ambit of government-set
awards—might improve the way the state employs these schemes by
facilitating a more systematic and consistent framework for decision
making. For example, the input of an objectivist innovation agenda can
be instrumental in: setting targets within a prizes scheme; defining
categories of research within which grants are available; and prioritizing
research projects conducted in government laboratories.235 Similarly,
while R&D tax credits are generally broadly applicable, the state could
potentially make tax credits only available in connection with R&D
projects focused on specific causes—or, at the very least, the percentage
of creditable research costs could vary by context.236 In addition, to
further an objectivist agenda, it might be advisable to set various criteria
and conditions for government funding (e.g., a criterion related to the
environmental impact of the technological innovation at hand).237 Such
factors could be incorporated, for example, into guidelines for peer
review of grant applications and in award criteria for procurement
auctions.
Finally, the measures used to calculate the size of the reward could also
be adjusted in an attempt to ensure better correlation to social value. With
respect to prizes, in particular, the reward could plausibly be determined
ex post, by various proxies of the invention’s actual impact.238 Notably,
under an objective well-being theory, caution should be employed in
using sales data for this end.239 Other assessments of ex post outcomes
indicative of social value, which are not so directly linked to market
demand, should be considered—for instance, observed outcome in terms
of improved health, reduced environmental impact, or other relevant

235. For a nonexhaustive list of information sources and various considerations that may be
used by policy makers in prioritizing among R&D projects, see supra notes 197–201 and
accompanying text.
236. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36, at 332.
237. See supra text accompanying note 192.
238. See supra text accompanying note 217.
239. Cf. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 29, at 1955–56 (discussing, in the context of the
continuum of excludability, the need to sever measures of social value from reliance on sales data).
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indicators.240
Clearly, the alternative institutions for incentivizing innovation are far
from perfect, and each one has its own drawbacks.241 This Article does
not purport to resolve all problems associated with these schemes, but it
certainly calls for further inquiry by scholars and policy makers to
address the challenges at hand. In light of the grave deficiencies of a
market-based approach, discussion of innovation policy cannot confine
itself to the mechanics of IP law and adequate attention must be paid to
the alternatives.242
B. Within Patent Law
The shift to an objective theory of well-being might call for certain
revisions in the patent system itself to reduce some of the distortive
effects resulting from its reliance on actual preferences. Patent law
generally applies in a uniform manner to all technologies.243
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, the patent
statute includes many flexible legal standards that could be used by the
courts as policy levers to take account of the varying needs of different
types of innovations in different industries, and enhance the way the
patent system deals with the wide range of technologies it covers. 244 In
the context discussed herein, such policy levers could also potentially be
harnessed to attain better correlation between incentives to innovate and
social value.
One set of rules and doctrines that could prove important in correlating
240. In the context of medicine, for example, “quality-adjusted life year” (“QALY”) or similar
measures may be helpful. See supra text accompanying notes 205–208. See also Rai, supra note
12, at 128–30 (discussing the possibility of using a prize system that calibrates rewards based on
the number of QALYs produced by the technology). For other possible considerations that may be
relevant in determining the size of the reward in connection with medical innovations, see supra
note 201.
241. Ultimately, optimal innovation policy is highly context-dependent, and the choice among
various funding schemes is affected by a variety of considerations, only some of which are
considered above. Other relevant factors are, for example, the timing of the reward, and whether
it is funded only by direct beneficiaries, as in the case of patents, or by the general public, as in the
cases of grants, prizes and tax credits. For discussion of these and other factors, see generally
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 36.
242. Cf. Kapczynski, supra note 36, at 1026 (encouraging the adoption of a broader frame of
reference for IP scholars and policy makers).
243. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1576–77 (noting that the patent statute creates
a general uniform set of legal rules that is designed to govern a wide variety of technologies).
244. Id. As highlighted by Burk and Lemley, some of the patent levers operate at an industrywide level, and some work at a case-by-case level, “treating some kinds of inventions differently
than others without explicit regard to industry, but in a way that has disproportionate effects on
certain industries.” Id. at 1579.
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incentives to innovate and social value are the ones that pertain to
patentability. A possible direction could be making applicable
patentability requirements more lenient in various manners to extend
patent protection to certain valuable innovations that are currently
nonpatentable—including various valuable “social innovations.”245 Yet,
for several reasons, this solution cannot be recommended. First, many of
such nonpatentable valuable inventions face low market demand and are
more difficult to exclude than other types of information goods, and
hence, the availability of patent protection would not provide a significant
incentive to develop them.246 Second, if one recognizes the high-social
value of such innovations to maximize utility, one should aim to enable
as many individuals as possible to benefit from them.247 Thus, in light of
the inherent restricted access entailed by patent protection, reliance on
nonpatent mechanisms for incentivizing innovation might be preferable
in such cases.248
Another direction could be to make the requirements for patentability
more stringent to make it more difficult to secure patent protection over
technologies with a relatively low social value. This would lower the
incentive provided by the patent system to produce such technologies, so
that more resources would ultimately be directed toward socially valuable
innovations. One of the patentability requirements that could be
particularly helpful in this regard is the utility requirement. Under the
utility requirement, an invention must be useful to warrant patent
protection.249 This requirement has lost much of its force in the last
several decades, except in certain limited contexts—notably in biology
and chemistry.250 To better align patent incentives with social value, a
245. See supra note 143 (regarding the concept of “social innovation”); Lee, supra note 4, at
43–45 (stating the reasons why such innovations are unlikely to satisfy current patentability
requirements).
246. See Lee, supra note 4, at 45 (concluding, for said reasons, that patenting social innovations
would be unlikely to generate significant revenues).
247. While this Article focuses on a utilitarian account of innovation, it should be noted that
extending patent protection to the domain of social innovation might be very problematic from a
distributive perspective as well. Cf. Kapczynski, supra note 36, at 1002–04 (noting that “some
information goods are of such foundational importance to human freedoms and capabilities that . .
. everyone should have them”).
248. See also Lee, supra note 4, at 46–47 (explaining why patent protection would defeat the
purpose and character of most social innovations, which are aimed at low-income populations).
249. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).
250. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1644 (noting that United States courts have
permitted patents even on inventions that seem calculated to deceive, and that “[t]he PTO has
permitted patents on a wide variety of seemingly frivolous inventions”); Michael Risch, A
Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58 (2011–2012) (describing the low
level of utility an applicant must currently demonstrate to obtain a patent: “[T]he invention need
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stricter standard of utility could perhaps be imposed, under which an
applicant would need to demonstrate the potential of his or her invention
to yield social benefits at a level exceeding a minimum threshold.251
A slightly different course that is worthy of careful consideration is to
make certain patentability requirements—including the utility and
nonobviousness requirements—more stringent in their application to
specific categories of inventions that might be overincentivized under the
current legal regime.252 One such category of inventions could be
improvements to existing consumer products.253 Such products might
already enjoy a heightened level of market demand as a result of various
factors discussed above—including hedonic adaptation and the
dependence of individual preferences on relative positions254—while
their contribution to human welfare over existing products may not
always be significant.255 Applying more stringent patentability standards
with respect to these type of inventions might reduce some of the
market’s distortive effects.256
One other, more concrete, proposal relates to the “nonobviousness”
requirement for patentability.257 Due to the difficulty to determine an
only operate as described and potentially provide some de minimis public benefit”).
251. The main challenge associated with this tentative proposal relates to the need to promulgate
such standard in a sufficiently detailed manner that does not leave an undue level of discretion at
the hands of individual patent examiners. It is not clear whether this is feasible.
252. For the ability to use legal standards included in the patent statute in a nuanced manner,
see supra note 244 and accompanying text. For general background with respect to the
nonobviousness requirement, see infra note 257.
253. For the ability to register a patent for an improvement, see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 115–28. Market demand for such inventions may
further increase as a result of marketing efforts designed to convince consumers to keep on buying
new improved versions of the same technological products. See supra text accompanying note 122.
255. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. Surely, some improvements may include
features with potential wide applicability in a variety of other products or serve as the basis for
follow-on innovations. In such cases, the social value of the improvement is comprised not only
of its stand-alone value, and this should be taken into account in designing the relevant patentability
standards.
256. Discussion of the challenges associated with defining such heightened patentability
standards is outside the scope of this Article. For a comparable proposal, made on different
grounds, see Ted O’Donoghue, A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation, 29 RAND
J. ECON. 654, 654 (1998) (suggesting to heighten patentability standards in the context of sequential
innovation in order to ensure longer market incumbency, and thus increase the level of profits that
each innovator can make). An analogy could also potentially be drawn to copyright law, where
courts have routinely subjected derivative works to a higher standard of originality. See, e.g.,
Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304–05 (7th Cir. 1983); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980); Batlin v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en
banc); but see Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 520–21 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting
that derivative works are not subject to a heightened standard of originality).
257. For the nonobviousness requirement, see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2014). Nonobviousness is often
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invention’s nonobviousness, courts have developed “secondary
considerations”—various objective factors extrinsic to the technical
features of the invention—that can assist in evaluating
nonobviousness.258 One of these secondary considerations is commercial
success.259 Yet, various scholars have criticized the use of commercial
success as a proxy of the technical ingenuity embodied in the invention,
noting that commercial success might result from a multiplicity of
market-related factors that are not necessarily related to technical
advancement.260 To the extent that market demand is not strongly
correlated with social value, as demonstrated in this Article, making
patent protection more available for commercially successful inventions
might also increase the already-existing distortive effect of the patent
system on resource allocation for R&D. 261 Thus, from this perspective
as well, it might be better to decrease the weight ascribed to market
success to determine nonobviousness and focus on other measurements
of technological ingenuity.
To prioritize inventions based on social value, it might also be possible
to use, as policy levers, the rules and doctrines pertaining to the features

considered to be the most important requirement for patentability. Merges, supra note 93, at 812.
Under this requirement, the invention must represent a technical advance that is not merely a trivial
step forward in the state of the art. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So
Obvious After All: Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight
Bias, 47 GA. L. REV. 41, 42 (2012-2103) (“The whole point of the [nonobviousness] doctrine is to
separate trivial advances from more substantial advances and to ensure that only the latter receive
patents.”); Merges, supra note 93, at 812 (noting that under the nonobviousness requirement, an
invention must be a “big enough technical advance”, it cannot merely be a “trivial step forward in
the art”).
258. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). For a discussion of
secondary considerations, see, for example, Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1651; Merges, supra
note 93, at 816.
259. In fact, commercial success is often considered to be the most influential secondary
consideration. Merges, supra note 93, at 823.
260. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966
SUP. CT. REV. 293, 332 (1966) (pointing out that the inferential chain from the fact of commercial
success to the question of obviousness is long, complex, and easily broken); Lunney & Johnson,
supra note 257, at 49–50 (noting that commercial success is not infallible evidence of
nonobvoiusness); Merges, supra note 93, at 806 (maintaining that reliance on commercial success
tends to reward superior distribution systems, marketing decisions, and service networks, instead
of rewarding actual invention). See also Shur-Ofry, supra note 90, at 67–73 (using complexity
studies to show that technologies possessing similar levels of technical advancement can differ
significantly in their level of success not only due to different marketing factors, but also due to
features of the social network in which they are diffusing).
261. Cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1652 (maintaining that the use of commercial success
is weighted toward patents that cover entire products that are actually sold in the market, in contrast
to upstream research tools or intermediary products).
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of patent protection, rather than to its availability.262 Among other
things, it might be possible to harness, to this end, the rules governing
patent scope, exceptions and limitations to rights of the patent holder, and
remedies for patent infringement. Many of these rules and doctrines are
structured as flexible legal standards and it might be possible to apply
them in a nuanced manner that would favor more valuable innovations.263
Finally, certain rules governing procedural aspects of patent
registration—including fee schedules and fast-track prioritized
examination procedures—might also be useful in prioritizing different
types of innovations.264
The proposals outlined above—regarding both nonpatent mechanisms
and the patent system itself—are only meant to serve as the starting point
for discussion. Further elaboration of these and other potential directions
is warranted as the objectivist framework of analysis continues to
develop. In light of the tentative nature of the recommendations, this
Article does not ascertain whether the proposed policy reforms conform
to the requirements of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)265—the primary international
instrument governing the IP arena.266
262. Cf. Ho, supra note 27, at 492 (suggesting that “perhaps there could be better tailoring of
patent rewards” to produce more innovative drugs, rather than incremental pharmaceutical
innovation).
263. Such tailoring, however, should be done very cautiously while balancing the potential
positive impact of strengthening patent protection for more valuable technologies with the potential
for increased costs in terms of restricted access to such innovations. See also supra note 196 and
accompanying text. In addition, while making such reforms in patent doctrine, it is important to
bear in mind that, as a general matter, there is no linear cause-effect connection between the scope
of IP protection and the level of incentives provided by the system. See Shur-Ofry, supra note 90,
at 96 (“The expectations that each increase in the scope of IP will lead to a proportionate increase
in the level of innovation; that each limitation of that scope will result in a corresponding decrease
in innovation; or that we can promote external socially desired values simply by limiting or
calibrating the scope of intellectual property protection—are unrealistic.”).
264. Consider, for example, the decision of a number of national IP offices across the world to
implement measures to fast-track “green” patent applications. See, e.g., Antoine Dechezleprêtre
and Eric Lane, Fast-Tracking Green Patent Applications, WIPO MAG. (June 2013),
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2013/03/article_0002.html (discussing the various
programs in place).
265. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81
[hereinafter TRIPS].
266. In general, it seems that the proposed measures could be implemented in a manner that
would not violate the international framework. TRIPS mandates that patents shall be available for
any inventions meeting the requirements for patentability and prohibits member states from
discriminating in the grant of patents based on “the field of technology.” TRIPS, supra note 265,
at art. 27(1). It does not prohibit, though, tailoring of patent protection based on the specific needs
of various industries. In practice, both in the United States and in Europe, various industry-specific
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V. POTENTIAL CRITICISM
Before concluding, it is worth addressing the main potential lines of
criticism against this Article’s proposal to embrace an objective criterion
of well-being as the basis for innovation law and policy. First, some
readers might contend that the objective theory of welfare advanced
herein is inherently paternalistic, as it is premised on the notion that a
person’s well-being is not necessarily determined according to his or her
own judgment.267 Regarding the specific context of innovation law
discussed herein, critics may stress that an objective welfare perspective
invites less neutrality from the state in setting the direction of innovation
and could result in undue government interference in the market.
This Article undeniably calls for greater state involvement. This is
justified in light of the deficiencies of the preference satisfaction criterion
and the distortive effects on incentives to innovate caused by an
unfettered reliance on the market.268 Yet, this Article does not advocate
an extreme interventionist approach. While an objective theory of wellbeing constrains the role of individual preferences, it is far from being
excessively paternalistic. As noted above, the “goods” on an objective
list are typically defined in a very broad manner, leaving room for
sufficient flexibility, rather than prescribing a uniform conception of the
“good life” that would fit everyone.269 Moreover, even in the context of
an objective theory of well-being, a person’s desires and sense of
enjoyment have significant weight.270 In the setting discussed herein,
such a flexible and pluralistic perception of well-being can, and should,
be reflected in how the state formulates its objectivist agenda and sets

rules have been enacted over the years. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1634 (noting
the existance of such industry-specific rules). In fact, the proposals made in this Article do not
necessarily require a differential treatment by “field of technology,” rather than by the specific
attributes of the invention at hand. In regards to alternative mechanisms for incentivizing
innovation, to the extent they are used as supplements to the patent system, the TRIPS does not
pose any barrier. While using such mechanisms as substitutes for patent protection might be more
problematic, international law does not prevent it so long as the option of registering a patent
remains available and the substitutes are merely voluntary. For a discussion, see Hemel &
Ouellette, supra note 36, at 370 (noting, for example, that the availability of prizes or grants could
be conditioned on an innovator’s consent to forgo patent protection or settle for a shorter patent
life).
267. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1710 (noting that an objective theory of wellbeing can be accused of paternalism).
268. See supra Part II.
269. See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. See also Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at
1710 (discussing the weight of autonomy, free-will and pleasure under an objective theory).
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priorities among various types of innovations.271
Most importantly, while an objective theory contends that the best
criterion of well-being has significant objective dimensions, it does not
mandate interference with individuals’ choices to coerce such
standards.272 In the context discussed herein, embracing an objective
perspective mandates that the state reevaluate its macro policy regarding
innovation funding, but does not call for the adoption of any measures
that would amount to regulation of consumer behavior. Under this
Article’s thesis, to promote the well-being of its constituents, the state
should make an effort to channel resources to innovative projects that
would generate the most socially valuable technologies. But even if the
proposed policy reforms that are designed to balance market distortions
are adopted, the state would not have absolute control over the direction
of innovative activity, and incentives to invest in innovative projects with
a relatively low social value might still be generated, either by the market
or outside of it.273 Most certainly, individual consumers could continue
to exert free choice in deciding which products available in the market to
purchase.
As to the argument that the proposed approach invites undue
government intervention, it is also important to note that the patent
system, to begin with, is far from being a regulation-free zone. As noted
by William Fisher and Talha Syed, “the shape of all markets is already
heavily influenced by state action,” and in fields covered by the patent
system, in particular, the market is “heavily shaped by the state.”274
Governments establish patent systems as a way to incentivize innovation

271. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 198–200 (discussing the possibility of using
studies of individual preferences and SWB surveys when formulating an objectivist innovation
agenda).
272. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 1712. See also Zamir, supra note 64, at 241 n.32
(“Rejection of actual preferences as a measure of well-being is typically grounded on the realization
that people’s actual preferences are frequently not in accord with their best interest. Such rejection
does not necessarily entail the endorsement of paternalism.”). Cf. Oren Bracha & Talha Syed,
Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229,
256 (2014) (noting that theories of human flourishing do not go “so far as to dictate the details of
individual or collective choices,” but rather seek to foster social conditions conducive to flourishing
lives).
273. See supra note 28 (noting various examples of nonmarket incentives).
274. Fisher & Syed, supra note 10, at 675, 677. See also Subha Ghosh, Patent Law and the
Assurance Game: Refitting Intellectual Property in the Box of Regulation, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURIS.
307 (2005) (explaining how patent law regulates the invention process and the market for
innovative products); Mark A. Lemley, IP and Other Regulations (Stanford Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 476, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2589278 (“IP laws are
deliberate government interventions in the market.”).
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in light of the free rider problem associated with information goods. 275
Thus, by design, the patent system interferes with the free market, and its
very purpose is to affect resource allocation. While seemingly extending
its protection uniformly to “anything under the sun that is made by
man,”276 the patent system is anything but neutral in its application to
various technologies. Among other things, the effectiveness of patent
incentives inherently depends on multiple factors that vary widely by
industry and by invention.277 Moreover, by setting patentability criteria,
the state takes a stance on the question of what is worthy of protection.278
In addition, as noted above, patent law includes many flexible standards,
which are operated by courts in a nuanced manner with respect to
different technologies.279 On a more fundamental level, as demonstrated
in this Article, the reliance of the patent system on market demand tends
to favor certain types of innovations, while underincentivizing others.280
Hence, no choice by the state in this context is truly neutral.281 In light
of all the above, this potential line of criticism—which focuses on the
alleged paternalistic nature of the objective approach—seems largely
misplaced.
A second line of criticism could doubt the practicability of the
proposed objectivist approach for innovation policy. The argument
might stress that the very nature of technological innovation precludes
the possibility of performing accurate ex ante evaluations of its social
value. Lacking concrete evidence, a decision maker, entrusted with the
task of assessing the potential value of different inventions, would
inevitably have to engage in guesswork and speculation. Moreover, it is
not clear how one is expected to prioritize between various technological
prospects based on their potential value for mankind, without injecting
275. See supra text accompanying notes 22–23.
276. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). See also supra note 243 and
accompanying text.
277. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1580–89.
278. Cf. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Eligible Patent Matter—Gender Analysis of Patent Law:
International and Comparative Perspectives, 19 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 851, 859
(2011) (stressing, in the context of a feminist analysis of patent law, that “patent law does not
provide protection for all products and processes equally, but only for those products or processes
that the law itself defines as worthy of protection”).
279. See supra text accompanying note 244.
280. For instance, the patent system disfavors innovation for the poor. See supra text
accompanying notes 47–49. See also Lee, supra note 4, at 6–7 (stressing the nonneutrality of
markets and arguing that “a market-based framework for driving innovation will not adequately
address the needs of the poor and underprivileged”).
281. See Boyle, supra note 7, at 111 (noting that the state already implicitly selects among types
of innovation).
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some subjective value judgment. Thus, even if a market mechanism is
imperfect, there may not be a workable alternative solution. To
paraphrase Winston Churchill on the subject of democracy, a marketbased platform might be a very bad way to incentivize innovation, except
for everything else that has been, or could be, tried.282
Indeed, this Article acknowledges the challenges associated with
developing and implementing an objective approach to innovation, and
to a large extent, already takes such challenges into account.283 Most
importantly, this Article does not doubt the necessity of some degree of
reliance on the market in incentivizing innovation, and accordingly, it
does not advocate abolishing the patent system. What this Article does
call for, first and foremost, is a conceptual change. Based on its
exploration of the deficiencies of preference satisfaction as a criterion of
well-being, this Article encourages the embracement of a new outlook—
which relies on an alternative criterion of well-being—as the foundation
for innovation policy. On a practical level—to the extent the state already
funds innovation outside the realm of the patent system—such new
conceptual framework might actually improve the way the state employs
such schemes, by providing a uniform rationale that could serve as a basis
for policy making. Nonetheless, this Article also encourages increasing
the weight of such alternative mechanisms to supplement and adjust
patent incentives; and by doing so, this Article stresses the importance of
developing rigorous metrics for evaluating R&D projects. Such metrics
are also needed to implement the proposed reforms to the patent system
itself. To formulate such metrics, further deliberation on the matter—
based on the initial inquiry conducted in this Article—is clearly
warranted.
In the end, this Article seeks to encourage scholars and policy makers
to attend to fundamental questions regarding the social value of
innovation that have been largely ignored thus far. At the same time, it
also sets a theoretical framework for deliberating such questions, while
proposing various directions, guidelines, and sources of information that
might be used for that matter. The objectivist approach that this Article
proposes surely does not need to be adopted all at once, and could rather
be implemented in a gradual fashion following a process of
282. Winston Churchill declared in 1947 that “it has been said that democracy is the worst form
of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” LITTLE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 100 (Susan Ratcliffe, ed., 5th ed. 2012).
283. See supra notes 193–196 (regarding the need to account for the difficulty to foresee, in
advance, which innovations will be developed in the future based on an existing technology). See
also supra note 255.
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experimentation with various funding schemes and different metrics for
welfare—employed, at first, in discrete technological domains.284
On a final note, it is important to stress that even readers who might
not feel comfortable with the objectivist approach for innovation policy
proposed in this Article—or with the specific policy measures
recommended herein—could find the critique of the prevalent preference
satisfaction criterion useful. At the very least, acknowledging the
dissonance between market value and social value should have an impact
in policy debates regarding proposals to extend or expand patent
protection.
CONCLUSION
Philosophers and legal theorists extensively debate the question of
which criterion of well-being the state should adopt. In the context of
innovation law and policy, however, this question is seldom discussed,
and the law-and-economics approach—equating well-being with
preference satisfaction—prevails. The reliance of the patent system on
the market allows policy makers and scholars to avoid dealing with the
need to evaluate technologies based on their social value. Technological
progress is commonly viewed as an end in itself, and the incentives
provided by the system are designed to generate future goods that current
market participants would value the most.
This Article demonstrates the shortcoming of this narrow perspective.
It identifies and criticizes the implied choice of preference satisfaction as
the criterion of well-being underlying innovation theory and policy
making. For various reasons explored above, the mere fact that a future
technology is likely to have demand in consumer markets does not
necessarily imply that said technology would enhance the well-being of
its users in any significant manner, and that it is therefore worthwhile for
the state to incentivize its development. This conclusion is reinforced
when considering the alternative investments to which the resources
invested in the development of such technology could have been
allocated.
To better align incentives with social value, this Article proposes a
conceptual shift to an objective theory of well-being. The adoption of
such a new perspective as the foundation for innovation law and policy
might have important normative implications. Among other things, the
shift to an objective welfare perspective bolsters the arguments in favor
of direct government funding of innovation. In addition, to implement
284. See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65
(2015) (discussing policy experimentation in the context of patent law).
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an objectivist agenda, certain reforms may be warranted in the patent
system itself.
Ultimately, this Article calls for a greater state involvement in
directing innovation. The formulation of a framework enabling the state
to pursue such a role in a systematic and coherent manner is undeniably
an ambitious enterprise. This Article undertakes a first step in this
endeavor, by stressing the importance of pursuing this direction and
setting initial guidelines that might serve as a solid foundation for others
to build upon.

